

Curriculum Vitae

Vincenzo Denicolò

Personal: Born 2 August 1959. Two daughters.

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Current position: Professor of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy

Previous positions:

Ricercatore (Assistant Professor), University of Bologna, 1983-1988

Associate Professor, University of Bologna, 1988-1990

Professor of Economics, University of Parma, 1990-1993

Visiting Fellow, University of Cambridge, U.K., 1996-97

Visiting Professor, European University Institute, 1998 and 2003

Visiting Professor, University Paris II, 2006.

Prizes: Premio Saint-Vincent for the monograph: *Scelta collettiva e rivelazione delle preferenze*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1990.

Editorship: Co-Editor, *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 2000-2003

Invited Seminars: Graz, Aix-en-Provence, Osnabruk, Copenhagen, EUI, York, Manchester, CORE, Helsinki, Lisbon, Mannheim, Paris, UCD, Toulouse, Kiel, Leicester, etc.

Referee for a number of scientific journals, including *Econometrica*, *American Economic Review*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *RAND Journal of Economics*, *Review of Economic Studies*

Selected Publications

1. Patents, Secrets, and the First Inventor Defense, 2004, *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* 13, 517-538 (with Luigi Franzoni).
2. The Contract Theory of Patents, *International Review of Law and Economics*, 2003, 23, 365-380 (with Luigi Franzoni).
3. How Should Forward Patent Protection Be Provided?, *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 2002, 20, 801-827 (with Piercarlo Zanchettin).
4. Sequential Innovation and the Patent-Antitrust Conflict, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 2002, 54, 649-668.
5. Growth with Non Drastic Innovations and the Persistence of Leadership, *European Economic Review*, 2001, 45, 1399-1413.
6. Two-stage Patent Races and Patent Policy, *RAND Journal of Economics*, 2000, 31 (3), 488-501.
7. Compatibility and Bundling with Generalist and Specialist Firms, *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 2000, 48 (2), 177-188.
8. Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation in Asymmetric Cournot Oligopolies, *International Tax and Public Finance*, 2000, 7, 335-342 (with Massimo Matteuzzi).
9. Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings, *Theory and Decision*, 2000, 48(4), 351-58 (with Marco Mariotti)
10. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Consistency of Choice, *Economic Theory*, 2000, 15(1), 221-26.
11. Rationing in a Durable Goods Monopoly, *RAND Journal of Economics*, 1999, 30 (1), 44-55 (with Paolo Garella).
12. Pollution Reducing Innovations under Taxes and Permits, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 1999, 51, 184-199.
13. The Optimal Life of a Patent when the Timing of Innovations Is Stochastic, *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 1999, 17(6), 827-846.
14. No-Envy and Arrow's Conditions, *Social Choice and Welfare*, 1999, 16(4), 585-97.
15. Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow Theorem, *Social Choice and Welfare*, 1998, 15, 563-566.
16. Patent Races and Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, *Journal of Industrial Economics*, 1996, 44, 249-265.
17. Regulating Innovative Activity: The Role of a Public Firm. *International Journal of Industrial Organization* 1993, 11, 35-48 (with Flavio Delbono)
18. Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 1993, 59, 324-332.
19. Incentives to Innovate in a Cournot Oligopoly, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1991, 105, 951-961 (with Flavio Delbono).
20. R& D Investment in a Symmetric and Homogeneous Duopoly: Bertrand vs. Cournot, *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 1990, 8, 297-313 (with Flavio Delbono).
21. International Monetary Cooperation under Tariff Threats, *Journal of International Economics*, 1990, 28 (1), 1-23 (with Giorgio Basevi and Flavio Delbono).
22. Some Analytics of the Laffer Curve: A Comment, *Journal of Public Economics* 1988, 35(1), 129-30.
23. Intransitive Social Strict Preference and the Arrow Theorem, *Economics Letters* 1987, 25(4), 311-314.

24. Some Further Results on Non-binary Social Choice, *Social Choice and Welfare*, 1987, 4, 277-285
25. Independent Social Choice Correspondences Are Dictatorial, *Economics Letters*, 1985, 19, 9-12.

Working papers

Do patents over-compensate innovators?

Trading with a common agent: ex ante inefficiency with complete information (with Gabriella Chiesa)

A signaling model of environmental overcompliance

Competition, Darwinian selection and growth (with Piercarlo Zanchettin)