| Curriculum Vitae | Published Papers | Working Papers | Materiale Didattico |
Vincenzo Denicolò is Professor of Economics at the University of Bologna. His main research interest currently is the economics of innovation and intellectual property, but he works, more broadly, on industrial organization and competition policy and maintains an interest in social choice theory, in which he has also published extensively in the past. He has been visiting fellow at Clare Hall (Cambridge) and visiting professor at the European University Institute and the University of Paris II. He served as co-editor of the International Journal of Industrial Organization and head of the Bologna Doctoral School in Economics and Statistics. Since 2006, he has been a Special Consultant at LECG, specializing in the intersection between intellectual property and competition policy.
E-mail: vincenzo.denicolo@unibo.it
Home page: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/denicolo/
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche
Università di Bologna
Piazza Scaravilli, 2
I-40126 Bologna
Italy
Phone [0039]0512098484
Fax [0039]0512098493
Competition, market selection and growth (with Piercarlo Zanchettin)
Trading with a common agent: the minimum rent equilibrium (with Gabriella Chiesa)
Competition and profits in an asymmetric homogeneous industry (with Piercarlo Zanchettin)
On the winner-take-all principle in innovation races (with Luigi Franzoni)
A signaling model of environmental overcompliance, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Trading with a common agent: a characterization of the Nash equilibria, Journal of Economic Theory (with Gabriella Chiesa)
Economic theories of the non-obviousness requirement for patentability: a survey, 2008 Lewis and Clark Law Review
Do patents over-compensate innovators?, 2007 Economic Policy
Patents, secrets, and the first inventor defense, 2004 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy (with Luigi Franzoni)
The contract theory of patents, 2003 International Review of Law and Economics (with Luigi Franzoni)
How should forward patent protection be provided?, 2002 International Journal of Industrial Organization (with Piercarlo Zanchettin)
Sequential innovation and the patent-antitrust conflict, 2002 Oxford Economic Papers
Growth with non drastic innovations and the persistence of leadership, 2001 European Economic Review
Two-stage patent races and patent policy, 2000 RAND Journal of Economics
Compatibility and bundling with generalist and specialist firms, 2000 Journal of Industrial Economics
Specific and Ad Valorem taxation in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies, 2000 International Tax and Public Finance (with Massimo Matteuzzi)
Nash bargaining theory, nonconvex problems and Social Welfare Orderings, 2000 Theory and Decision (with Marco Mariotti)
Independence of irrelevant alternatives and consistency of choice, 2000 Economic Theory
Rationing in a durable goods monopoly, 1999 RAND Journal of Economics (with Paolo Garella)
Pollution reducing innovations under taxes and permits, 1999 Oxford Economic Papers
The optimal life of a patent when the timing of innovations is stochastic, 1999 International Journal of Industrial Organization
Independent decisiveness and the Arrow theorem, 1998 Social Choice and Welfare
Patent races and optimal patent length and breadth, 1996 Journal of Industrial Economics
Regulating innovative activity: the role of a public firm, 1993 International Journal of Industrial Organization (with Flavio Delbono)
Fixed agenda social choice theory, 1993 Journal of Economic Theory
Incentives to innovate in a Cournot oligopoly, 1991 Quarterly Journal of Economics (with Flavio Delbono)
R& D investment in a symmetric and homogeneous duopoly: Bertrand vs. Cournot, 1990 International Journal of Industrial Organization (with Flavio Delbono)
International monetary cooperation under tariff threats, 1990 Journal of International Economics, (with Giorgio Basevi and Flavio Delbono)
Public debt and the Pasinetti paradox, 1990 Cambridge Journal of Economics (with Massimo Matteuzzi).
Some analytics of the Laffer curve: a comment, 1988 Journal of Public Economics
Some further results on non-binary social choice, 1987 Social Choice and Welfare
Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial, 1995 Economics Letters