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Matteo Cervellati Cervellati Teo Home space Research space Teaching space cv space Address
Abstract: The demographic transition is an important turning point for population dynamics. Based on this observation, this paper investigates the hypothesis that the causal effect of life expectancy on growth in income per capita is non-monotonic. Results from different empirical specifications and identification strategies document that the effect is negative before the demographic transition, but strongly positive after its onset. The findings also show that life expectancy has robust non-monotonic effects on population growth, and affects fertility, age structure and education attainments. The results provide a new interpretation of the contradictory existing evidence and have relevant policy implications. Keywords: Life Expectancy, Demographic Transition, Population Growth, Fertility, Malthusian Effects, Non-Monotocities, Epidemiological Revolution. Download: June 2011 (pdf), Additional Material (pdf) Previous draft: CEPR DP 7361, 2009 (pdf) Disease and Development: The Role of Life Expectancy Reconsidered with Uwe Sunde
Abstract: This note estimates the causal effect of life expectancy on per capita income and tests the hypothesis of a non-monotonic effect using finate mixture models. The results confirm the hypothesis and qualify the recent evidence for a negative effect by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Keywords: Life Expectancy, Demographic Transition, Epidemiological Revolution, Heterogenous Treatment Effects, Finate Mixture Models.The Economic and Demographic Transition, Mortality, and Comparative Development with Uwe Sunde Abstract: We present a theory of the economic and demographic transition where adult longevity, child mortality, fertility and the education composition of the population are jointly determined. The model allows to investigate the determinants of underdevelopment traps as well as the mechanism that leads to an endogenous exit out of the trap, and to assess the role of exogenous reductions in mortality and the role of permanent differences in extrinsic mortality across countries. The theory delivers a series of novel predictions which are illustrated with a simple dynamic simulation of the model. These predictions are shown to be consistent with evidence using both time series data and cross-country panel data. Keywords: Economic and Demographic Transition, Adult Longevity, Child Mortality, Heterogeneous Human Capital, Comparative Development, Development Traps, Kernel Distributions. Version November 2011: (pdf) Previous drafts of the project: IZA DP 2905, 2007 (pdf)
, CEPR
DP 6384, 2007 (pdf) Longevity and Lifetime Labor Supply: Evidence and Implications Revisited with Uwe Sunde Abstract: Hazan (2009) presents a model predicting that an increase in expected total lifetime work hours is a necessary condition for greater longevity to induce more schooling. The observation of a continued reduction of expected total work hours leads Hazan (2009) to conclude that longevity improvements cannot explain the observed increases in schooling in the U.S. over the past 150 years. This conclusion questions the relevance of the link between mortality decline and investment in human capital. This paper generalizes Hazan's
(2009) theoretical analysis and shows that, in general, the necessary
condition for a reduction in Keywords: Longevity, Human Capital, Lifetime Labor Supply, Survival Probability, Rectangularization Download: version march 2010 (pdf) back to papersSpatial Distribution of Human Infectious Agents and
Differences with Uwe Sunde and Simona Valmori Abstract: This paper proposes a new measure of exposure to diseases and extrinsic mortality based on the prevalence of multi-host vector-transmitted, MHV pathogens. The spatial distribution and the geographical determinants of the exposure to human infectious agents across countries is investigated. MHV diseases are difficult to eradicate, since they multiply in multiple hosts, and are bound to local geographical conditions which are required for the transmission vectors to live. The analysis relies on information on the presence of each of the endemic infectious agents and not on the spread of the disease. The results document that disease richness is related to broad measures of health outcomes and is a good predictor of the probability of observing epidemics. The proposed measure of disease richness is conceptually unrelated to the level of economic development and it may provide useful information on extrinsic mortality for a wide range of cross-country studies. Keywords: Exogenous Disease Environment, Richness of Human Infectious Agents, Multi-Host Vector-Transmitted Pathogens, Spatial Distribution, Cross-Country Correlates, Diseases Eradication, Epidemics, Life Expectancy, Child Mortality. Download: version march 2010 (pdf) back to papersDemocratization and the Rule of Law with Piergiuseppe Fortunato and Uwe Sunde Abstract: This paper provides a theory of the interactions between democratization and the emergence of rule of law. Heterogeneous individuals can make costly investments in protection against expropriation by others and the state. The public enforcement of property rights, whose cost depends on these investments, is chosen by the politically enfranchised population. We characterize the dynamic evolution of the economy in which both the political regime and property rights are endogenously determined. There are multiple politico-economic equilibria in terms of public and private property rights protection, which interact with different democratization scenarios whose determinants and consequences are studied. Democratic transitions under conflict may lead to failed democracies with worse property rights protection than oligarchies. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus, however, serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable polities. Keywords: Democratization, Oligarchy, Rule of Law, Democratization Scenario, Multiple Equilibria, Path Dependence Download: (pdf) Work Values, Endogenous Sentiments and Redistribution With Joan Esteban and Laurence Kranich Abstract: We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe. Keywords: Social Contract, Endogenous Sentiments, Voting over Taxes, Moral Work Values, Redistribution, Inequality, Politico-Economic Equilibrium. Download: version february 2010 (pdf) "Thou shalt not covet ...": Prohibitions, Temptation and Moral Values With Paolo Vanin Abstract: We propose a
theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and
internally sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally)
sanction prohibited actions and their desire may increase utility by
reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial commitment
devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under
which agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty.
Incentives to be moral are non-monotonic in the crime premium. Larger
external punishments increase Keywords: Prohibitions, Temptation, Self-Control, Moral Values, Crime. Download: version March 2010 (pdf) Democratization and Endogenous Constitutions With Piergiuseppe Fortunato and Uwe Sunde, mimeo 2005 Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of the political institutions emerging from the process of democratization. We provide a novel theory of endogenous democratization to study how the constitution, both in terms of form of government and electoral rules, depends on the level of inequality at the moment of the democratic transition. The constitutional details, in turn, affect both the level of development and the dynamic evolution of economic inequality. The model delivers a series of theoretical predictions which, jointly with the main assumptions, are tested using the available cross country data. Keywords: Endogenous Democratic Transition, Endogenous Constitutions, Form of State, Electoral Rules, Presidential State, Political Lobbying, Redistribution Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition With Piergiuseppe Fortunato and Uwe Sunde, 2011 Abstract: This paper investigates the role of violent civil conflicts during the process of democratization for the quality of emerging democracies, and in particular, the protection of civil (political and economic) liberties. The paper presents a simple theory where different groups may engage in violent conflicts to be the ruler. The theory predicts a crucial role for the democratization scenario. A peaceful democratization leads to democracies with a high degree of civil liberties, reflecting a social contract according to which all groups are politically represented and the rulers optimally abstain from wasteful rent extraction. A transition to democracy under a violent conflict is less likely to lead to a system with a high protection of civil liberties. Empirical evidence from the third wave of democratization using within country variability with a difference-in-difference methodology supports the theoretical predictions. The findings suggest that violent conflicts during the democratic transition have persistent negative effects on the quality of the emerging democracies. Download: (pdf) Democratization, Violent Social Conflicts, and Growth with Uwe Sunde, 2011 Abstract: This paper investigates the empirical role of violent conflicts for the causal effect of democracy on economic growth. Exploiting within-country variation to identify the effect of democratization during the ``Third Wave'', we find evidence that the effect of democratization is weaker than reported previously once one accounts for the incidence of conflict, while the incidence of conflict itself significantly reduces growth. The results show in turn that permanent democratic transitions significantly reduce the incidence and onset of conflict, which suggests that part of the positive growth effect of democratization arises because democratization reduces conflict incidence. When accounting for the role of violence during democratization, we find evidence that peaceful transitions to democracy have a significant positive effect on growth that is even larger than reported in the previous literature, while violent transitions to democracy have no, or even negative, effects on economic growth. Download: (pdf) Disease Environment and Civil Conflicts with Uwe Sunde and Simona Valmori, 2011 Abstract: This paper tests the hypothesis that a high
and persistent exposure to infectious diseases increases the likelihood
of civil conflicts. Diseases that are difficult to prevent and treat
may reduce the opportunity costs of violent activities, both directly
and indirectly. The analysis exploits new data on the number of
multi-host vector-transmitted infectious diseases that are Download: (pdf) Resistance to Reforms, Inequality and Development With Piergiuseppe Fortunato, 2004 Abstract: We provide a politico economic theory of resistance to reforms and long term development. We consider the endogenous adoption of productive reform opportunities. Innovations allow improving average income but are non neutral with respect to the returns to different production factors; hence inequality in the distribution of endowments induces conflict of interests. We study the emergence and the disappearance of vested interests and resistance to reforms in a subsequent generations framework. The gradual implementation of reforms changes the relative importance as sources of income of the di¤erent factors of production. This implies that households.dynastic attitude towards modernization changes. Economic inequality harms the development process. The dynamic evolution of the system is theoretically characterized. A simple simulation illustrates the ability of the model to study the role of inequality for the endogenous transition to modern growth, the disappearance of vested interests and to explain experiences of overtaking and divergence. Keywords: Reforms, Economic Inequality, Natural Resources, Long Run Growth. Human Capital, Life Expectancy and the Process of Development With Uwe Sunde Published in: American Economic Review 95(5), pp. 1653-1672, 2005 Abstract: This paper provides a unified theory of the transition in income, life expectancy, education and population, experienced by the Western world when passing from an environment of economic stagnation to sustained growth. The transition is based on the interplay between human capital formation, technological progress, and life expectancy. A positive feedback between human capital accumulation and longevity is eventually triggered when endogenous skill-biased technological progress provides sufficiently high returns to human capital for large fractions of the population to outweigh the costs in terms of lifetime spent on education. Keywords: long-term development, endogenous life expectancy, heterogeneous human capital, technological progress, industrial revolution. Download: pdf Previous version: IZA DP 585, 2002 (pdf) Growth and Endogenous Political Institutions With Piergiuseppe Fortunato and Uwe Sunde Published in: Institutions and Growth (Theo Eicher and Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa eds.), MIT Press, Cambridge MA, ch. 8, pp. 215-248, 2006 Abstract: In this paper we study the dynamics of political institutions and the different public policies they imply. While political institutions are influenced by economic development, they are in turn a key determinant of the development process. In particular, democratic institutions implement different public policies than oligarchies, and therefore imply different economic outcomes. Economic development in turn increases the likelihood of transitions from oligarchy to democracy because it changes the relative costs for and benefits from the public policies arising under democratic regimes. Democratic regimes tend to provide more efficient public policies, and more redistribution than oligarchic regimes. The results are compared to historical and empirical evidence, and the consequences of the simplifying assumptions are discussed in detail. Keywords: Endogenous Democratic Transition, Political Institutions, Public Goods, Redistribution, Growth. Download: mimeo, 2004 (pdf). Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development With Piergiuseppe Fortunato and Uwe Sunde The Economic Journal, 2008 (18), 1354-1384. Abstract: This paper studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the rocess of economic development. Favorable economic institutions in form of a state of law and the absence of societal conflict are not assumed exogenously under certain political systems, but arise in equilibrium. The model delivers several new results. Efficient oligarchies can emerge in equilibrium and persist supported by all groups. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality. We find a non monotonic relationship between inequality and state of law. The model allows to analytically characterize the dynamic emergence of different institutions, highlighting the role of natural resource abundance and inequality for endogenous institutional change and the timing of democratic transitions. The model can generate episodes of reversal of fortunes as result of endogenous institutional change. A simple simulation illustrates the evolution of the economy. Keywords: Inequality, Democratization, Institutions, State of Law, Long-term Development Download: (pdf) Previous Version: IZA DP 1445, 2005 (pdf) Are All Democracies Equally Good? The Role of Interactions between Political Environment and Inequality for Rule of Law With Piergiuseppe Fortunato and Uwe Sunde Ecomics Letters 99 (3), 552-556 Abstract: Using cross-country data, we find evidence for a significant negative interaction effect between democracy and inequality in determining the quality of growth-promoting institutions like rule of law. Democracy is associated with institutions of higher quality when inequality is lower. Keywords: inequality, democracy, institutions, rule of law, interactions Download: (pdf) Previous Version: IZA DP 2984, 2007 (pdf) Contact: m.cervellati@unibo.it, matteo.cervellati@gmail.com
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