

Web appendix of the paper "Competitive quantity discounts" by Giacomo Calzolari and Vincenzo Denicolò, Nov. 4th 2011

(*The derivation of the analysis has been grouped in
the following cells that could be opened to see the content*)

(*PART I EQUILIBRIUM DERIVATION WITH NON-LINEAR PRICES*)

(*HERE WE FIRST DETERMINE EQUILIBRIUM NON-LINEAR PRICES*)

(*PREFERENCES*)

$u = x (q_a + q_b) - (1 - g) / 2 (q_a^2 + q_b^2) - g q_a q_b;$

(*types x uniformly distributed on [0,1] *)

$c_a = 0;$

$c_b = c * q_b;$

$u_{esc} = u / . q_b \rightarrow 0;$

(*General linear-quadratic schedules*)

$p_a = a_0 + a_1 q_a + a_2 q_a^2;$

$p_b = b_1 q_b + b_2 q_b^2;$

(*notice that to clarify notation here we indicate the parameters
for A's tariff with a_0, a_1, a_2 and those of B with b_0, b_1, b_2
Furthermore, $b_0=0$ for Wilson's Lemma*)

(*UNCONSTRAINED MONOPOLY*)

qm = qa /. Solve[D[u - pa /. qb → 0, qa] == 0, qa][[1, 1]]

(*for no distortion at the top it must be the following ,
that allows to determine the a2*)

tmp2 = qa /. Solve[D[u /. qb → 0, qa] == 0, qa][[1, 1]]

a2m = a2 /. FullSimplify[Solve[qm == tmp2 /. x → 1, a2]][[1, 1]]

(*then define profits*)

Prm = FullSimplify[Integrate[pa /. qa → qm /. a2 → a2m, {x, a1, 1}]]

$$\frac{-a_1 + x}{1 + 2 a_2 - g}$$

$$\frac{x}{-1 + g}$$

$$\frac{1}{2} a_1 (-1 + g)$$

$$\frac{(-1 + a_1) (a_1 - 3 a_0 (-1 + g))}{3 (-1 + g)}$$

(*and find the optimal a1*)

(*notice that the unconstrained monopolist makes a certain type indifferent to participating and not and then for Wilson Lemma it must be that a0=0, hence ...*)

tmp = a1 /. FullSimplify[Solve[{D[Prm, a1] == 0 /. a0 → 0}, {a1}][[1, 1]]

a1m = FullSimplify[tmp]

a2m = a2m /. a1 → a1m

$$\frac{1}{2}$$

$$\frac{1}{2}$$

$$\frac{1}{4} (-1 + g)$$

(*hence we can define the pricing schedule with unconstrained monopoly*)

pm = a0 + a1m qa + a2m qa^2 /. a0 → 0

qm = FullSimplify[qm /. {a1 → a1m, a2 → a2m}]

$$\frac{qa}{2} + \frac{1}{4} (-1 + g) qa^2$$

$$\frac{1 - 2 x}{-1 + g}$$

(*CONSTRAINED MONOPOLIST*)

(*Limit Price when B is not active*)

qmlim = qa /. FullSimplify[Solve[c == D[u, qb] /. qb -> 0, qa]][[1, 1]]

(*which is implemented identifying the parameters a1 and a2 such that qm=qmlim*)

tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[$\left\{ \frac{-a1}{1 + 2 a2 - g} = \frac{-c}{g}, \frac{1}{1 + 2 a2 - g} = 1/g \right\}$, {a1, a2}]]

a1mlim = a1 /. tmp[[1, 1]]

a2mlim = a2 /. tmp[[1, 2]]

$$\frac{-c + x}{g}$$

$$\left\{ \left\{ a1 \rightarrow c, a2 \rightarrow -\frac{1}{2} + g \right\} \right\}$$

c

$$-\frac{1}{2} + g$$

(*Here we verify when the monopolist is indeed unconstrained,

i.e. when it is the case that for any x qm>qalim:*)

cd = c /. FullSimplify[Solve[(qm /. x -> 1) == qmlim /. x -> 1, c]][[1, 1]]

Factor[qm - qmlim /. x -> 1]

$$2 + \frac{1}{-1 + g}$$

$$\frac{1 - c - 2g + cg}{(-1 + g)g}$$

(*notice that cd could be found also as in

the paper: the c such that the marginal utility for type x=1 of good qb when qa is the monopoly quantity is equal to c, so that B can never be active fi it has a larger c*)

FullSimplify[Solve[0 == D[u, qb] - c /. {qb -> 0, qa -> qm} /. x -> 1, c]]

$$\left\{ \left\{ c \rightarrow 2 + \frac{1}{-1 + g} \right\} \right\}$$

(*hence, for c>cd qm>qmlim for the highest typex =1*)

(*We now see that for g<1/3 qmlim is steeper in x than qm and viceversa for g>1/3*)

FullSimplify[D[qm, x] - D[qmlim, x]]

$$\frac{1 - 3g}{(-1 + g)g}$$

(*Hence it follows that for g<1/3 when c>

cd qm>qmlim for any x and the monopolist is uncontested

we then explore the case g>1/3 now...*)

```

xm = x /. Solve[qmlim == qm, x][[1, 1]]
FullSimplify[Solve[1/2 == xm, c]]
FullSimplify[xm - 1/2]

```

$$\frac{-c + g + c g}{-1 + 3 g}$$

$$\left\{ \left\{ c \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \right\} \right\}$$

$$\frac{(-1 + 2 c) (-1 + g)}{-2 + 6 g}$$

(*hence when $g \geq 1/3$ (i) if $c > 1/2$ then q_{mlim} and q_m intersect at a $x_m < 1/2$ where $1/2$ is the lowest buying type with q_m and then since q_m is steeper than q_{alim} (see above) we again have that $q_m \geq q_{mlim}$ for any x and the monopolist is uncontested
(ii) if instead $c < 1/2$ for $x < x_m$ $q_m < q_{mlim}$ and then the quantity that can be implemented for those types is q_{mlim} and the lowest participating type is $x = c$ whilst the lowest type buying with q_m is x_m . The proof in the text shows that indeed q_{mlim} is optimal in this case*)

(*Summarizing the MONOPOLY CASES are as follows:*)

(*Region RM: uncontested monopoly*)

(*the other parameters a_1 and a_2 determined as above as well as q_m and then here we have by Wilson's Lemma*)

```
a0RM = 0;
```

```
a1RM = a1m;
```

```
a2RM = a2m;
```

```
paRM = pm;
```

```
qaRM = qm;
```

```
pm /. qa -> qm;
```

```
PraRM = FullSimplify[Integrate[%, {x, 1/2, 1}]]
```

(*the marginal type is at $x=1/2$, see q_{amon} *)

```
PrbRM = 0;
```

```
uRM = FullSimplify[uesc - pm /. qa -> qm]
```

```
URM = FullSimplify[Integrate[uRM, {x, 1/2, 1}]]
```

```
WRM = FullSimplify[PraRM + PrbRM + URM]
```

```
CarltonRM = Max[PrbRM, URM]
```

$$\frac{1}{12 - 12 g}$$

$$-\frac{(1 - 2 x)^2}{4 (-1 + g)}$$

$$\frac{1}{24 - 24 g}$$

$$\frac{1}{8 - 8 g}$$

$$\text{Max}\left[0, \frac{1}{24 - 24 g}\right]$$

(*Region

RML: for high types there is monopoly and for low types there is limit pricing,
let us derive all parameters here:

the idea is that q_m , a_1 , a_2 remain unchanged

(notice that this implies that the a_1 is still determined under the assumption $a_0=0$),
the only difference is that a_0 is no more nil, whilst $a_{0lim}=0$ for Wilson's lemma;
 a_{0m} is determined by making the prices p_m and p_{mlim} equal for the indifferent type x_m
*)

$paRLMlow = pa /. \{a_1 \rightarrow a_{1lim}, a_2 \rightarrow a_{2lim}, a_0 \rightarrow 0\};$

$tmp =$

$FullSimplify[Solve[(paRLMlow /. qa \rightarrow q_{lim} /. x \rightarrow x_m) == (a_0 + p_m /. qa \rightarrow q_m /. x \rightarrow x_m), a_0]]$

$a_{0RLMhigh} = a_0 /. tmp[[1, 1]]$

(*and for types larger than x_m we have as in the unconstrained monopolist*)

$a_{1RLMhigh} = a_{1m};$

$a_{2RLMhigh} = a_{2m};$

$q_{aRLMhigh} = q_m;$

$paRLMhigh = pa /. \{a_0 \rightarrow a_{0RLMhigh}, a_1 \rightarrow a_{1RLMhigh}, a_2 \rightarrow a_{2RLMhigh}\};$

$x_{RLM} = x_m;$

(*for lower types we have the constrained quantity and schedule:*)

$a_{0RLMlow} = 0;$

$a_{1RLMlow} = a_{1lim};$

$a_{2RLMlow} = a_{2lim};$

$q_{aRLMlow} = q_{lim};$

(*the schedule $paRLMlow$ is defined few lines above*)

$$\left\{ \left\{ a_0 \rightarrow -\frac{(1-2c)^2}{-4+12g} \right\} \right\}$$

$$-\frac{(1-2c)^2}{-4+12g}$$

(*Defining the payoffs*)

pa /. {a1 -> a1RLMlow, a2 -> a2RLMlow, a0 -> a0RLMlow} /. qa -> qmlim;
 pm /. qa -> qm;

PraRLM = FullSimplify[Integrate[%, {x, c, xRLM}] + Integrate[% + a0RLMhigh, {x, xRLM, 1}]]
 PrbRLM = 0

uesc - pa /. {a1 -> a1RLMlow, a2 -> a2RLMlow, a0 -> a0RLMlow} /. qa -> qmlim;
 uesc - pm - a0RLMhigh /. qa -> qm;
 URLM = FullSimplify[Integrate[%, {x, c, xRLM}] + Integrate[%, {x, xRLM, 1}]]

WRLM = FullSimplify[URLM + PraRLM + PrbRLM]

CarltonRLM = Max[PrbRLM, URLM];

$$\frac{1 + c (3 - 6c + 4c^2) (-1 + g) - 2g}{6 (1 + g (-4 + 3g))}$$

0

$$\frac{1 + (-3 + g)g + 3c^2 (-1 + g) (-3 + 7g) - 4c^3 (1 + g (-3 + 2g)) - 3c (2 + g (-7 + 5g))}{6 (1 - 3g)^2 (-1 + g)}$$

$$\frac{3 (-1 + c) c + 2g + c (9 - 2c (3 + 2c)) g + (1 + c)^2 (-5 + 4c) g^2}{6 (1 - 3g)^2 (-1 + g)}$$

(*DUOPOLY*)

(*DUOPOLY: DERIVATION OF PRICE SCHEDULES*)

(*Consumer's quantities in duopoly*)

tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[{D[u - pa - pb, qa] == 0, D[u - pa - pb, qb] == 0}, {qa, qb}]]
 qad = qa /. tmp[[1, 1]]
 qbd = qb /. tmp[[1, 2]]

$$\left\{ \left\{ qa \rightarrow \frac{b1 g + a1 (-1 - 2 b2 + g) + x + 2 b2 x - 2 g x}{(1 + 2 a2) (1 + 2 b2) - 2 (1 + a2 + b2) g}, qb \rightarrow \frac{a1 g + b1 (-1 - 2 a2 + g) + x + 2 a2 x - 2 g x}{(1 + 2 a2) (1 + 2 b2) - 2 (1 + a2 + b2) g} \right\} \right\}$$

$$\frac{b1 g + a1 (-1 - 2 b2 + g) + x + 2 b2 x - 2 g x}{(1 + 2 a2) (1 + 2 b2) - 2 (1 + a2 + b2) g}$$

$$\frac{a1 g + b1 (-1 - 2 a2 + g) + x + 2 a2 x - 2 g x}{(1 + 2 a2) (1 + 2 b2) - 2 (1 + a2 + b2) g}$$

```

(*using no-distortion at the top to determine a2 and b2*)
tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[{D[u, qa] == 0, D[u - c qb, qb] == 0}, {qa, qb}]]
qafb = qa /. tmp[[1, 1]]
qbfb = qb /. tmp[[1, 2]]

tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[{qafb == qad /. x -> 1, qbfb == qbd /. x -> 1}, {a2, b2}]]
a2d = a2 /. tmp[[1, 1]]
b2d = b2 /. tmp[[1, 2]]


$$\left\{ \left\{ qa \rightarrow \frac{c g}{1 - 2 g} + x, qb \rightarrow \frac{c - c g}{-1 + 2 g} + x \right\} \right\}$$



$$\frac{c g}{1 - 2 g} + x$$



$$\frac{c - c g}{-1 + 2 g} + x$$



$$\left\{ \left\{ a2 \rightarrow \frac{a1 (-1 + 2 g)}{2 + 2 (-2 + c) g}, b2 \rightarrow \frac{(b1 - c) (-1 + 2 g)}{2 + 2 c (-1 + g) - 4 g} \right\} \right\}$$



$$\frac{a1 (-1 + 2 g)}{2 + 2 (-2 + c) g}$$



$$\frac{(b1 - c) (-1 + 2 g)}{2 + 2 c (-1 + g) - 4 g}$$


(*To derive the duopoly schedules,
we have to procede keeping into account that a1 and b1 each affect
participation under the duopoly scheduels. To this end we procede as follows:*)

(*first define for a given type t,
its associated indirect utility when buying from both firms*)
vt = FullSimplify[u - pa - pb - b0 /. {qa -> qad, qb -> qbd} /. x -> t]


$$\frac{1}{2 (1 + 2 a2) (1 + 2 b2) - 4 (1 + a2 + b2) g}$$


$$\left( -2 a0 (1 + 2 a2) (1 + 2 b2) - 2 (1 + 2 a2) b0 (1 + 2 b2) + b1^2 (1 + 2 a2 - g) + \right.$$


$$a1^2 (1 + 2 b2 - g) + 4 a0 (1 + a2 + b2) g + 4 b0 (1 + a2 + b2) g -$$


$$\left. 2 b1 (1 + 2 a2 - 2 g) t + 2 (1 + a2 + b2 - 2 g) t^2 - 2 a1 (b1 g + t + 2 b2 t - 2 g t) \right)$$


(*Then we solve for the fixed fees (in equilibrium could be nil)
leaving a degree of freedom over the level of utility type t gets: i.e. *)

a0dtmp = a0 /. Solve[vt == k, a0][[1, 1]];
b0dtmp = b0 /. Solve[vt == h, b0][[1, 1]];

(*Then we consider the uppart part of profits, that with duopoly, *)

profitatmp = FullSimplify[a1 qa + a2 qa^2 + a0dtmp /. {qa -> qad} /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d}];
profitbtmp = FullSimplify[b1 qb + b2 qb^2 - c qb + b0dtmp /. {qb -> qbd} /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d}];

```

```

profita = Integrate[profitatmp, {x, t, 1}];
profitb = Integrate[profitbtmp, {x, t, 1}];

```

```

Ha1 = D[profita, a1];
Hb1 = D[profitb, b1];
Simplify[{Ha1 == 0, Hb1 == 0}];
solutionsd = FullSimplify[Solve[%, {a1, b1}]]

```

$$\left\{ \left\{ a1 \rightarrow 1 + (-2 + c)g, b1 \rightarrow \frac{-1 + 2g(2 + (-2 + c)g)}{-1 + 3g} \right\}, \right.$$

$$\left\{ a1 \rightarrow \frac{(-1 + 2g)(1 + (-2 + c)g)}{-1 + 3g}, b1 \rightarrow 1 + (-2 + c)g \right\},$$

$$\left\{ a1 \rightarrow \frac{(1 + (-2 + c)g) \left(3 - 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right)}{4 - 8g}, \right.$$

$$b1 \rightarrow -\frac{3 + c - 9g - 2cg + 6g^2 - 3cg^2 + (1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g) \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)}}{2(-2 + 4g)} \left. \right\},$$

$$\left\{ a1 \rightarrow \frac{(1 + (-2 + c)g) \left(-3 + 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right)}{-4 + 8g}, \right.$$

$$b1 \rightarrow \frac{-3 - c + 9g + 2cg - 6g^2 + 3cg^2 + (1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g) \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)}}{2(-2 + 4g)} \left. \right\}$$

(*Substituting any one of the four pairs of solutions into quantities qad and qbd, the three first pair of solutions lead to impossibilities and the fourth instead not, hence the solution is the fourth as it can be also verified noticing that it is the only one that coincides with that of the symmetric case when c=0*)

```
FullSimplify[solutionsd /. c -> 0]
```

$$\left\{ \left\{ a1 \rightarrow 1 - 2g, b1 \rightarrow -\frac{(1 - 2g)^2}{-1 + 3g} \right\}, \left\{ a1 \rightarrow -\frac{(1 - 2g)^2}{-1 + 3g}, b1 \rightarrow 1 - 2g \right\}, \right.$$

$$\left\{ a1 \rightarrow \frac{1}{4} \left(3 - 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right), b1 \rightarrow \frac{1}{4} \left(3 - 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right) \right\},$$

$$\left\{ a1 \rightarrow \frac{1}{4} \left(3 - 3g - \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right), b1 \rightarrow \frac{1}{4} \left(3 - 3g - \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right) \right\} \left. \right\}$$

(*Before defining a1 and b1 is useful to write them in a more compact way based on the symmetric case:*)

$$as = \frac{1}{4} \left(3 - 3g - \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right);$$

```
FullSimplify[a + (cga / (1 - 2g)) - a1 /. solutionsd[[4, 1]] /. a -> as]
FullSimplify[a + (c(1 - 2g - a(1 - g)) / (1 - 2g)) - b1 /. solutionsd[[4, 2]] /. a -> as]
```

0

0

```
(*Hence, we (re)define ...*)
ald = a + (c g a / (1 - 2 g))
b1d = a + (c (1 - 2 g - a (1 - g)) / (1 - 2 g))
a2d = FullSimplify[a2d /. a1 -> ald]
b2d = FullSimplify[b2d /. b1 -> b1d]
```

```
pad = a0 + ald qa + a2d qa ^ 2
pbd = b0 + b1d qb + b2d qb ^ 2
```

$$a + \frac{a c g}{1 - 2 g}$$

$$a + \frac{c (1 - a (1 - g) - 2 g)}{1 - 2 g}$$


$$-\frac{a}{2}$$

$$-\frac{a}{2}$$

$$a0 + \left(a + \frac{a c g}{1 - 2 g} \right) qa - \frac{a qa^2}{2}$$

$$b0 + \left(a + \frac{c (1 - a (1 - g) - 2 g)}{1 - 2 g} \right) qb - \frac{a qb^2}{2}$$

```
((1 - 2 g - a (1 - g)) / (1 - 2 g)) /. a -> as;
Plot[%, {g, 0, 1/2}]
```



(*Now we define the LIMIT TARIFF of A when B is active and then offers pbd determined above*)

```
(*Limit Price when B is not active*)
FullSimplify[Solve[b1 == D[u, qb] /. qb -> 0, qa]]
qdlim = Factor[qa /. %[[1, 1]] /. b1 -> b1d]
```

$$\left\{ \left\{ qa \rightarrow \frac{-b1 + x}{g} \right\} \right\}$$

$$\frac{a + c - a c - 2 a g - 2 c g + a c g - x + 2 g x}{g (-1 + 2 g)}$$

```

(*which is implemented identifying the parameters a1 and a2 such that qm=qmlim*)
tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[{{ $\frac{-a1}{1+2a2-g} = \frac{-b1}{g}$ ,  $\frac{1}{1+2a2-g} = 1/g$ }}, {a1, a2}]]]
a1dlim = a1 /. tmp[[1, 1]]
a2dlim = a2 /. tmp[[1, 2]]

{{a1 → b1, a2 →  $-\frac{1}{2} + g$ }}

b1

 $-\frac{1}{2} + g$ 

(*To verify the expression in the text notice that ...*)
FullSimplify[a2dlim - (a2d - (1 - 2g - a) / 2)]

0

(* Hence we (re)define ...*)
a1dlim = FullSimplify[a1dlim /. b1 → b1d]
a2dlim = FullSimplify[a2d - (1 - 2g - a) / 2]

pdlim = a0 + a1dlim qa + a2dlim qa^2

c +  $\frac{a(-1+c+2g-cg)}{-1+2g}$ 

 $-\frac{1}{2} + g$ 

a0 +  $\left(c + \frac{a(-1+c+2g-cg)}{-1+2g}\right) qa + \left(-\frac{1}{2} + g\right) qa^2$ 

(*Now we define the regions RMLD and RLD*)

ctilde = c /. FullSimplify[Solve[b1d == 1/2, c]][[1, 1]]
(*since this states that we have that type x=
b1d which is marginal with the limit quantity is equal to the type x=
1/2 which is marginal with the monopoly quantity*)
ctilde = ctilde /. a → as;

xdtilde =
x /. FullSimplify[Solve[qm == qdlim, x] /. {a2 → a2d, b2 → b2d} /. {a1 → a1d, b1 → b1d}][[1, 1]]

qdtilde = FullSimplify[qdlim /. x → xdtilde /. {a2 → a2d, b2 → b2d} /. {a1 → a1d, b1 → b1d}]

(*notice that when the monopoly does not exist and the lowest part
is characterized by limit pricing then the lowest buying type is x=b1d*)

 $\frac{(-1+2a)(-1+2g)}{2+2a(-1+g)-4g}$ 

 $\frac{-a(1+c(-1+g)-2g)(-1+g) + (c(-1+g)+g)(-1+2g)}{1+g(-5+6g)}$ 

 $\frac{2ac}{1-2g} + \frac{(-1+2a)(-1+2c)}{-1+3g}$ 

```

`xdhat =
x /. FullSimplify[Solve[qbd == 0, x] /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d} /. {a1 -> a1d, b1 -> b1d}][[1, 1]]`

`qdhat = FullSimplify[qad /. x -> xdhat /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d} /. {a1 -> a1d, b1 -> b1d}]`

`(*notice the following ...*)`

`FullSimplify[Solve[qdlim == qad, x] /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d} /. {a1 -> a1d, b1 -> b1d}][[1, 1]]`

`FullSimplify[xdhat - x /. %]`

`(*i.e. clearly when qbd is nil at that point A switches to the limit pricing*)`

$$\frac{c(-1+g) + a(-1+c+2g-cg)}{-1+2g}$$

$$\frac{c}{1-2g}$$

$$x \rightarrow \frac{c(-1+g) + a(-1+c+2g-cg)}{-1+2g}$$

0

`(*Now we calculate the fix fees and the payoffs in region RMLD*)`

`a0dlimRMLD = a0 /. FullSimplify[Solve[pm == pdlim /. qa -> qdtilde, a0]][[1, 1]]`

`FullSimplify[Solve[pad == (pdlim /. a0 -> a0ddlim) /. qa -> qdhat, a0]]`

`a0dRMLD = a0 /. %[[1, 1]] /. a0ddlim -> a0dlim`

$$\frac{(-1+c(2-4g) + 2a(1+c(-1+g) - 2g) + 2g)^2}{4(1-2g)^2(-1+3g)}$$

$$\left\{ \left\{ a0 \rightarrow a0ddlim - \frac{c^2(-1+a+2g)}{2(1-2g)^2} \right\} \right\}$$

$$a0dlim - \frac{c^2(-1+a+2g)}{2(1-2g)^2}$$

```

pm /. qa -> qm;
pdlim /. {a1 -> a1dlim, a2 -> a2dlim, a0 -> a0dlimRMLD} /. qa -> qdlim;
pad /. qa -> qad /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d} /. {a1 -> a1d, b1 -> b1d} /. a0 -> a0dRMLD /.
  a0dlim -> a0dlimRMLD;
PrarMLD = FullSimplify[Integrate[%%, {x, 1/2, xdtilde}] +
  Integrate[%, {x, xdtilde, xdhat}] + Integrate[%, {x, xdhat, 1}]]

pbd - c qb /. qb -> qbd /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d} /. {a1 -> a1d, b1 -> b1d} /. b0 -> 0;
PrbrMLD = FullSimplify[Integrate[%, {x, xdhat, 1}]]

uesc - pm /. qa -> qm;
uesc - pdlim /. {a1 -> a1dlim, a2 -> a2dlim, a0 -> a0dlimRMLD} /. qa -> qdlim;
u - pad - pbd /. {qa -> qad, qb -> qbd} /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d} /. {a1 -> a1d, b1 -> b1d} /.
  a0 -> a0dRMLD /. a0dlim -> a0dlimRMLD /. b0 -> 0;
URMLD = FullSimplify[Integrate[%%, {x, 1/2, xdtilde}] +
  Integrate[%, {x, xdtilde, xdhat}] + Integrate[%, {x, xdhat, 1}]]

WRMLD = FullSimplify[URMLD + PrarMLD + PrbrMLD]

CarltonRMLD = Max[PrbrMLD, URMLD]

```

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{1}{12 (-1 + 2g)^3 (-1 + 3g)} \\
& \left(8a^3 (1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3 + 4a^2 (1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3 (-4 + 3g) - 2a (1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3 (-5 + 6g) - \right. \\
& \left. (-1 + 2g) \left(-(-1 - 2g)^2 + 6c(1 - 2g)^2 + 2c^3(-1 + g)^2 - 6c^2(1 + g(-3 + 2g)) \right) \right) \\
& \frac{(-1 + a)a(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3}{3(-1 + 2g)^3} \\
& - \frac{1}{24(1 - 3g)^2(-1 + 2g)^3} \left(16a^3(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3(-1 + 2g) - \right. \\
& \left. 4a(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3(10 - 39g + 36g^2) + 4a^2(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3(11 + 3g(-11 + 6g)) + \right. \\
& \left. (-1 + 2g) \left(12c(1 - 2g)^2(3 + g(-11 + 9g)) + 4c^3(-1 + g)^2(3 + g(-11 + 9g)) - \right. \right. \\
& \left. \left. 12c^2(-1 + g)(-1 + 2g)(3 + g(-11 + 9g)) - (1 - 2g)^2(13 + g(-61 + 72g)) \right) \right) \\
& \frac{1}{24(1 - 3g)^2(-1 + 2g)^3} \\
& \left(16a^3(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3g - 12a(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3(-1 + 2g) + 4a^2(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3 \right. \\
& \left. (-1 + 9g(-1 + 2g)) - (-1 + 2g) \left(12c(1 - 2g)^2(2 + g(-8 + 9g)) + 4c^3(-1 + g)^2(2 + g(-8 + 9g)) - \right. \right. \\
& \left. \left. 12c^2(-1 + g)(-1 + 2g)(2 + g(-8 + 9g)) - (1 - 2g)^2(11 + g(-55 + 72g)) \right) \right) \\
& \text{Max} \left[\frac{(-1 + a)a(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3}{3(-1 + 2g)^3}, \right. \\
& \left. - \frac{1}{24(1 - 3g)^2(-1 + 2g)^3} \left(16a^3(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3(-1 + 2g) - 4a(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3 \right. \right. \\
& \left. \left(10 - 39g + 36g^2 \right) + 4a^2(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3(11 + 3g(-11 + 6g)) + \right. \\
& \left. (-1 + 2g) \left(12c(1 - 2g)^2(3 + g(-11 + 9g)) + 4c^3(-1 + g)^2(3 + g(-11 + 9g)) - \right. \right. \\
& \left. \left. 12c^2(-1 + g)(-1 + 2g)(3 + g(-11 + 9g)) - (1 - 2g)^2(13 + g(-61 + 72g)) \right) \right) \left. \right]
\end{aligned}$$

(*Now we calculate the fix fee and the payoffs in region RLD*)

FullSimplify[Solve[pad == (pdlim /. a0 -> 0) /. qa -> qdhat, a0]]

a0dRLD = a0 /. %[[1, 1]]

$$\left\{ \left\{ a0 \rightarrow -\frac{c^2 (-1 + a + 2g)}{2 (1 - 2g)^2} \right\} \right\}$$

$$-\frac{c^2 (-1 + a + 2g)}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}$$

pdlim /. {a1 -> a1dlim, a2 -> a2dlim, a0 -> 0} /. qa -> qdlim;

pad /. qa -> qad /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d} /. {a1 -> a1d, b1 -> b1d} /. a0 -> a0dRLD;

PraRLD = FullSimplify[Integrate[%%, {x, b1d, xdhat}] + Integrate[%, {x, xdhat, 1}]]

FullSimplify[pbd - c qb /. qb -> qbd /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d} /. {a1 -> a1d, b1 -> b1d} /. b0 -> 0];

PrbRLD = FullSimplify[Integrate[%, {x, xdhat, 1}]]

uesc - pdlim /. {a1 -> a1dlim, a2 -> a2dlim, a0 -> 0} /. qa -> qdlim;

u - pad - pbd /. {qa -> qad, qb -> qbd} /. {a2 -> a2d, b2 -> b2d} /. {a1 -> a1d, b1 -> b1d} /.

{a0 -> a0dRLD, b0 -> 0};

URLD = FullSimplify[Integrate[%%, {x, b1d, xdhat}] + Integrate[%, {x, xdhat, 1}]]

WRLD = FullSimplify[URLD + PraRLD + PrbRLD]

CarltonRLD = Max[PrbRLD, URLD];

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{6 (-1 + 2g)^3} \left(c^2 g (-2c + 4cg + 3a(-1 + c + 2g - cg)) + \right. \\ & \quad \left. (-1 + a)(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g) \left(3c^2(1 - 2g) + 2a(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)(1 - 2g + c(2 + g)) \right) \right) \\ & \frac{(-1 + a)a(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)^3}{3(-1 + 2g)^3} \\ & - \frac{1}{6(-1 + 2g)^3} \left(c^3 g^2 + (-1 + a)(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g) \right. \\ & \quad \left. (-2 + c + c^2 - 2(-1 + c)(4 + c)g - 2(-2 + c)^2 g^2 + a(1 + c(-1 + g) - 2g)(2 + c + 2(-2 + c)g)) \right) \\ & \frac{1}{24} \left((-1 + a^2)(-2 + c)^3 - \frac{c^2(3a^2(-2 + c) + c - 6ac)}{(1 - 2g)^2} + \frac{2a^2 c^3}{(-1 + 2g)^3} - \frac{6(1 + a(-2 + c) - c)c^2}{-1 + 2g} \right) \end{aligned}$$

(*THIS CONCLUDES THE DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM WITH NON-LINEAR PRICING*)

(* Plotting quantities for non-linear pricing: the RMLD region (Figure 1 in the paper)*)

```


parameters = {g → 0.22, c → 1 / 2};
xdhatplot = xdhat /. {a2 → a2d, b2 → b2d} /. {a1 → a1d, b1 → b1d} /. {a → as} /. parameters;
xdtildeitplot = xdtilde /. {a2 → a2d, b2 → b2d} /. {a1 → a1d, b1 → b1d} /. {a → as} /. parameters;



qadplot = Plot[qad /. {a2 → a2d, b2 → b2d} /. {a1 → a1d, b1 → b1d} /. {a → as} /. parameters,
  {x, xdhatplot, 1}, AxesOrigin → {0, 0},
  PlotStyle → {Thickness[0.005], Black}, DisplayFunction → Identity];
qdlimplot = Plot[qdlim /. {a2 → a2d, b2 → b2d} /. {a1 → a1d, b1 → b1d} /. {a → as} /. parameters,
  {x, xdtildeitplot, xdhatplot}, AxesOrigin → {0, 0},
  PlotStyle → {Thickness[0.005], Black}, DisplayFunction → Identity];
qmplot = Plot[qm /. {a2 → a2d, b2 → b2d} /. {a1 → a1d, b1 → b1d} /. {a → as} /. parameters,
  {x, 1 / 2, xdtildeitplot}, AxesOrigin → {0, 0},
  PlotStyle → {Thickness[0.005], Black}, DisplayFunction → Identity];



qbdplot = Plot[qbd /. {a2 → a2d, b2 → b2d} /. {a1 → a1d, b1 → b1d} /. {a → as} /. parameters,
  {x, xdhatplot, 1}, AxesOrigin → {0, 0},
  PlotStyle → {Thickness[0.005], Black}, DisplayFunction → Identity];

Show[qadplot, qdlimplot, qmplot, qbdplot, PlotRange → {0, 1.3}, AxesLabel → {"θ", "qi(θ)"},
  AspectRatio → 0.7, AxesOrigin → {0.4, 0}, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

```







(* RMLD plot of the price schedules *)

```

parameters = {c → 0.4, g → 0.2};
pmplotRMLD = pm /. parameters /. qa → q;
pdlimplotRMLD = pdlim /. a0 → a0dlimRMLD /. a → as /. parameters /. qa → q;
padplotRMLD = pad /. a0 → a0dRMLD /. a → as /. parameters /. qa → q;
pbduoplotRMLD = pbd /. b0 → 0 /. a → as /. parameters /. qb → q;

qdtildeplot = qdtilde /. a → as /. parameters;
pricedlimconstplot =
  pdlim /. a0 → a0dlimRMLD /. a0lim → a0limRMLD /. a → as /. parameters /. qa → q /.
  q → qdtildeplot;


qdhatplot = qdhat /. a → as /. parameters; (*att*)
pricedconstplot =
  pad /. a0 → a0dRMLD /. a0lim → a0limRMLD /. a → as /. parameters /. qa → q /. q → qdhatplot;

pbduoplotRMLDshow = Plot[pbduoplotRMLD, {q, 0, 1},
  PlotStyle → {Dashing[{0.02, 0.01}], Thickness[0.005]}, DisplayFunction → Identity];
paduoplotRMLDshow = Plot[padplotRMLD, {q, 0, 1},
  PlotStyle → {Dashing[{0.02, 0.01}]}, DisplayFunction → Identity];
palimplotRMLDshow = Plot[pdlimplotRMLD, {q, 0, 1},
  PlotStyle → {Dashing[{0.002, 0.001}]}, DisplayFunction → Identity];
pointupRMLD = Graphics[{PointSize[0.015], Point[{qdhatplot, pricedconstplot}]}];

pmplotRMLDshow = Plot[pmplotRMLD, {q, 0, 1}, DisplayFunction → Identity];
pointlowRMLD = Graphics[{PointSize[0.015], Point[{qdtildeplot, pricedlimconstplot}]}];

Show[pbduoplotRMLDshow, paduoplotRMLDshow,
  palimplotRMLDshow, pointupRMLD, pmplotRMLDshow, pointlowRMLD,
  AxesLabel → {"q", "P"}, PlotRange → {0, 0.5},
  TextStyle → {FontSlant → "Italic", FontSize → 10}, Ticks → {Automatic, Automatic},
  AspectRatio → 0.7, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

```



(*this shows that first the monopolist price is admissible, then it becomes with a too low marginal price and is substituted by the limit price and then the duopoly becomes admissible*)

(* RLD plot of the price schedules*)


```

parameters = {c → 0.2, g → 1 / 4};
pdlimplotRLD = pdlim /. a0 → 0 /. a → as /. parameters /. qa → q;
padplotRLD = pad /. a0 → a0dRLD /. a → as /. parameters /. qa → q;
pbdplotRLD = pbd /. b0 → 0 /. a → as /. parameters /. qb → q;
qdhatplotRLD = qdhat /. a → as /. parameters;
priceplotRLD = pdlim /. a0 → 0 /. a → as /. parameters /. qa → q /. q -> qdhatplotRLD;

pbdplotRLDshow = Plot[pbdplotRLD, {q, 0, 1},
  PlotStyle → {Dashing[{0.02, 0.01}], Thickness[0.005]}, DisplayFunction → Identity];
padplotRLDshow = Plot[padplotRLD, {q, 0, 1}, PlotStyle → {Dashing[{0.02, 0.01}]},
  DisplayFunction → Identity];
pdlimplotRLDshow = Plot[pdlimplotRLD, {q, 0, 1},
  PlotStyle → {Dashing[{0.002, 0.001}]}, DisplayFunction → Identity];
pointplotRLD = Graphics[{PointSize[0.015], Point[{qdhatplotRLD, priceplotRLD}]}];

Show[pbdplotRLDshow, padplotRLDshow, pdlimplotRLDshow, pointplotRLD,
  AxesLabel → {"q", "P"}, PlotRange → {0, 0.3},
  TextStyle → {FontSlant → "Italic", FontSize → 10}, Ticks -> {Automatic, Automatic},
  AspectRatio → 0.7, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

```



(*this shows that the limit price has a lower marginal price than the duopoly for low quantities and viceversa for high quantities*)

(*PART II EQUILIBRIUM WITH LINEAR PRICING*)

```

(*First assume firm B is active*)
tmp = FullSimplify[
  Solve[{D[u - pal qa - pbl qb, qa] == 0, D[u - pal qa - pbl qb, qb] == 0}, {qa, qb}]
qal = qa /. tmp[[1, 1]]
qbl = qb /. tmp[[1, 2]]

xl = x /. Simplify[Solve[qbl == 0, x]][[1, 1]]
(* types smaller than this do not purchase from B*)


$$\left\{ \left\{ qa \rightarrow \frac{pal - g pal - g pbl}{-1 + 2g} + x, qb \rightarrow \frac{-pbl + g (pal + pbl - 2x) + x}{1 - 2g} \right\} \right\}$$



$$\frac{pal - g pal - g pbl}{-1 + 2g} + x$$



$$\frac{-pbl + g (pal + pbl - 2x) + x}{1 - 2g}$$



$$\frac{-pbl + g (pal + pbl)}{-1 + 2g}$$


(*Deriving qa for types purchasing only
from A but when higher types also purchase from B*)
uesc = u /. qb → 0;
qaesc1 = qa /. FullSimplify[Solve[D[uesc - pal qa, qa] == 0, qa]][[1, 1]]
(*Notice that types lower than pal do not buy at all*)


$$\frac{pal - x}{-1 + g}$$


(*Calculating total quantities and profits *)
Qa = FullSimplify[ Integrate[qaesc1, {x, pal, xl}] + Integrate[qal, {x, xl, 1}]]
Qb = FullSimplify[Integrate[qbl, {x, xl, 1}]]
Pral = FullSimplify[Qa pal]
Prbl = FullSimplify[Qb (pbl - c)]


$$\frac{(-1 + pal)^2 + g^2 (-2 + pal + pbl)^2 - g (4 + 3 (-2 + pal) pal + (-2 + pbl) pbl)}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}$$



$$\frac{(1 - pbl + g (-2 + pal + pbl))^2}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}$$



$$\frac{pal \left( (-1 + pal)^2 + g^2 (-2 + pal + pbl)^2 - g (4 + 3 (-2 + pal) pal + (-2 + pbl) pbl) \right)}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}$$



$$\frac{(-c + pbl) (1 - pbl + g (-2 + pal + pbl))^2}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}$$


(*Now we derive the equilibrium prices*)

(*consider first the necessary condition for pb*)
FullSimplify[D[Prbl, pbl]]


$$\frac{(1 - pbl + g (-2 + pal + pbl)) (1 - 2c (-1 + g) - 3pbl + g (-2 + pal + 3pbl))}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}$$


```

(*this becomes zero for two pb that respectively nullify the first and the second term in the numerator. However the first root for pb is not an optimum since it implies a zero Qb. Hence the candidate optimum is the second one which nullifies the second term in the numerator ...*)

```
tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[(1 - pbl + g (-2 + pal + pbl)) == 0, pbl]]
FullSimplify[Qb /. tmp[[1, 1]]]
```

$$\left\{ \left\{ \text{pbl} \rightarrow -\frac{1 + g (-2 + \text{pal})}{-1 + g} \right\} \right\}$$

0

```
tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[1 - 2 c (-1 + g) - 3 pbl + g (-2 + pal + 3 pbl) == 0, pbl]]
pbltmp = pbl /. tmp[[1, 1]]
```

$$\left\{ \left\{ \text{pbl} \rightarrow \frac{1 - 2 c (-1 + g) + g (-2 + \text{pal})}{3 - 3 g} \right\} \right\}$$

$$\frac{1 - 2 c (-1 + g) + g (-2 + \text{pal})}{3 - 3 g}$$

(*Now we consider the optimal pa*)

```
tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[D[Pral, pal] == 0, pal]]
pal1 = pal /. tmp[[1, 1]]
pal2 = pal /. tmp[[2, 1]]
```

$$\left\{ \left\{ \text{pal} \rightarrow -\frac{1}{3 (1 + (-3 + g) g)} \left(-2 + 2 g (3 + g (-2 + \text{pbl})) + \sqrt{(1 + g^4 (-2 + \text{pbl})^2 + 6 g^3 \text{pbl} (-3 + 2 \text{pbl}) + g^2 (1 + 2 (11 - 6 \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) + 3 g (-1 + (-2 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl})} \right) \right\} \right\},$$

$$\left\{ \left\{ \text{pal} \rightarrow \frac{1}{3 (1 + (-3 + g) g)} \left(2 - 2 g (3 + g (-2 + \text{pbl})) + \right. \right.$$

$$\left. \left. \sqrt{1 + g^4 (-2 + \text{pbl})^2 + 6 g^3 \text{pbl} (-3 + 2 \text{pbl}) + g^2 (1 + 2 (11 - 6 \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) + 3 g (-1 + (-2 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl})} \right) \right\} \right\}$$

$$-\frac{1}{3 (1 + (-3 + g) g)} \left(-2 + 2 g (3 + g (-2 + \text{pbl})) + \right.$$

$$\left. \sqrt{1 + g^4 (-2 + \text{pbl})^2 + 6 g^3 \text{pbl} (-3 + 2 \text{pbl}) + g^2 (1 + 2 (11 - 6 \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) + 3 g (-1 + (-2 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl})} \right)$$

$$\frac{1}{3 (1 + (-3 + g) g)} \left(2 - 2 g (3 + g (-2 + \text{pbl})) + \right.$$

$$\left. \sqrt{1 + g^4 (-2 + \text{pbl})^2 + 6 g^3 \text{pbl} (-3 + 2 \text{pbl}) + g^2 (1 + 2 (11 - 6 \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) + 3 g (-1 + (-2 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl})} \right)$$

```
FullSimplify[pal1 - pal2]
```

$$\frac{2 \sqrt{1 + g^4 (-2 + \text{pbl})^2 + 6 g^3 \text{pbl} (-3 + 2 \text{pbl}) + g^2 (1 + 2 (11 - 6 \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) + 3 g (-1 + (-2 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl})}}{3 (1 + (-3 + g) g)}$$

```
palsola = pal /. FullSimplify[Solve[pal == pal1 /. pbl -> pbltmp, pal]][[1, 1]]
palsolb = pal /. FullSimplify[Solve[pal == pal1 /. pbl -> pbltmp, pal]][[2, 1]]
tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[pal == pal2 /. pbl -> pbltmp, pal]]
```

$$\frac{(2g(36+g(-41+5c-5(-2+c)g)) - 3(6+\sqrt{(9+4g((-3+2g)(1+(-1+g)g)(5+g(-5+2g))-2c(-1+g)(-1+2g)(3+g(-7+g(2+g)))})+c^2(-1+g)^2(3+g(-12+g(12+g))))))}{((-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g))}$$

$$\frac{(2g(36+g(-41+5c-5(-2+c)g)) + 3(-6+\sqrt{(9+4g((-3+2g)(1+(-1+g)g)(5+g(-5+2g))-2c(-1+g)(-1+2g)(3+g(-7+g(2+g)))})+c^2(-1+g)^2(3+g(-12+g(12+g))))))}{((-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g))}$$

$$\left\{ \left\{ \text{pal} \rightarrow \frac{1}{(-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g)} (2g(36+g(-41+5c-5(-2+c)g)) - 3(6+\sqrt{(9+4g((-3+2g)(1+(-1+g)g)(5+g(-5+2g))-2c(-1+g)(-1+2g)(3+g(-7+g(2+g)))})+c^2(-1+g)^2(3+g(-12+g(12+g)))))) \right\}, \right.$$

$$\left. \left\{ \text{pal} \rightarrow \frac{1}{(-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g)} (2g(36+g(-41+5c-5(-2+c)g)) + 3(-6+\sqrt{(9+4g((-3+2g)(1+(-1+g)g)(5+g(-5+2g))-2c(-1+g)(-1+2g)(3+g(-7+g(2+g)))})+c^2(-1+g)^2(3+g(-12+g(12+g)))))) \right\} \right.$$

```
FullSimplify[palsola - pal /. tmp[[1, 1]]]
```

```
FullSimplify[palsolb - pal /. tmp[[2, 1]]]
```

```
0
```


```
0
```

(*there are two coincident solutions,
hence we take only the first two: palsola palsolb*)

```
FullSimplify[palsola /. c -> 0]
```

```
Plot[%, {g, 0, 1/2}]
```

$$\frac{2g(36+g(-41+10g)) - 3\left(6 + \sqrt{(3-2g(5+g(-5+2g)))^2}\right)}{(-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g)}$$




(*this graph shows that the solution palsola is not admissible since either the price is larger than one or it is negative and in any case it is increasing in g*)

(*this graph shows that the solution is indeed palsolb *)

```
FullSimplify[palsolb /. c -> 0]
Plot[%, {g, 0, 1/2}]
```

$$\frac{2g(36 + g(-41 + 10g)) + 3\left(-6 + \sqrt{(3 - 2g(5 + g(-5 + 2g)))^2}\right)}{(-3 + 4g)(9 + 4(-6 + g)g)}$$



(*notice that the denominator in pa2sol becomes zero for certain values of admissible g....*)

```
FullSimplify[Solve[Denominator[palsolb] == 0, g]]
```

$$\left\{ \left\{ g \rightarrow \frac{3}{4} \right\}, \left\{ g \rightarrow 3 - \frac{3\sqrt{3}}{2} \right\}, \left\{ g \rightarrow \frac{3}{2} (2 + \sqrt{3}) \right\} \right\}$$

(*in particular this is the case when $g = \frac{3}{2} (2 + \sqrt{3})$, however, looking at the necessary condition that delivers the two solutions, we can see that for that value of g the coefficient of the quadratic term for pa vanishes and the equation becomes one of first order. This shows that the fact that the denominator of palsolb vanishes is not a problem, and the solution should be seen as the limit of palsolb for g that tends to $\frac{3}{2} (2 + \sqrt{3})$ which in fact corresponds to the solution of the polynomial of degree one when the coefficient of the quadratic term vanishes (this is always the case for the roots of any polynomial of degree two when the coefficient of the quadratic term can vanish for some values of the parameters).*)

```
palinear = palsolb
```

$$\frac{(2g(36 + g(-41 + 5c - 5(-2 + c)g)) + 3(-6 + \sqrt{(9 + 4g((-3 + 2g)(1 + (-1 + g)g)(5 + g(-5 + 2g)) - 2c(-1 + g)(-1 + 2g)(3 + g(-7 + g(2 + g))) + c^2(-1 + g)^2(3 + g(-12 + g(12 + g)))})))}{((-3 + 4g)^2(9 + 4(-6 + g)g))}$$

(*now we can calculate the equilibrium price for B*)

(*To this end we simply solve the system of foc for the prices and determine the solution for pb associate to the solution for pa which is equal to pa2sol*)

tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[{D[Pral, pal] == 0, D[Prbl, pbl] == 0}, {pal, pbl}]]

$$\left\{ \{pbl \rightarrow 1, pal \rightarrow 1\}, \left\{ pbl \rightarrow \frac{5}{3} + \frac{2}{3(-1+g)}, pal \rightarrow \frac{1}{3} \right\}, \right.$$

$$\left. \left\{ pbl \rightarrow \frac{1}{(-1+g)(-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g)} \left(9+2c(-1+g)(-9+g(36+g(-36+7g))) + g(-48+2(-2+g)g(-21+2g) - \sqrt{(9+4g((-3+2g)(1+(-1+g)g)(5+g(-5+2g)) - 2c(-1+g)(-1+2g)(3+g(-7+g(2+g))) + c^2(-1+g)^2(3+g(-12+g(12+g))))} \right) \right) \right\}, \right.$$

$$\left. pal \rightarrow \frac{1}{(-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g)} \left(2g(36+g(-41+5c-5(-2+c)g)) + 3(-6 + \sqrt{(9+4g((-3+2g)(1+(-1+g)g)(5+g(-5+2g)) - 2c(-1+g)(-1+2g)(3+g(-7+g(2+g))) + c^2(-1+g)^2(3+g(-12+g(12+g))))} \right) \right) \right\},$$

$$\left\{ pbl \rightarrow \frac{1}{(-1+g)(-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g)} \left(9+2c(-1+g)(-9+g(36+g(-36+7g))) + g(-48+2(-2+g)g(-21+2g) + \sqrt{(9+4g((-3+2g)(1+(-1+g)g)(5+g(-5+2g)) - 2c(-1+g)(-1+2g)(3+g(-7+g(2+g))) + c^2(-1+g)^2(3+g(-12+g(12+g))))} \right) \right) \right\},$$

$$\left. pal \rightarrow \frac{1}{(-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g)} \left(2g(36+g(-41+5c-5(-2+c)g)) - 3(6 + \sqrt{(9+4g((-3+2g)(1+(-1+g)g)(5+g(-5+2g)) - 2c(-1+g)(-1+2g)(3+g(-7+g(2+g))) + c^2(-1+g)^2(3+g(-12+g(12+g))))} \right) \right) \right\}$$

FullSimplify[palinear - pal /. tmp[[3, 2]]]

pblinear = pbl /. tmp[[3, 1]]

0

$$\frac{1}{(-1+g)(-3+4g)(9+4(-6+g)g)} \left(9+2c(-1+g)(-9+g(36+g(-36+7g))) + g(-48+2(-2+g)g(-21+2g) - \sqrt{(9+4g((-3+2g)(1+(-1+g)g)(5+g(-5+2g)) - 2c(-1+g)(-1+2g)(3+g(-7+g(2+g))) + c^2(-1+g)^2(3+g(-12+g(12+g))))} \right) \right)$$

(*Rewriting the equilibrium prices in more compact way, asin the text of the paper*)

$$g_0 = 3 - 2g(5 + g(-5 + 2g));$$

$$g_1 = -8(-1 + g)g(-1 + 2g)(3 + g(-7 + g(2 + g)));$$

$$g_2 = 4(-1 + g)^2g(3 + g(-12 + g(12 + g)));$$

$$g_c = \sqrt{g_0^2 + g_1c + g_2c^2};$$

$$g_{a3} = 2(3 - g)(1 - 2g)(3 - 5g);$$

$$g_{a4} = (3 - 4g)(9 + 4(-6 + g)g);$$

$$g_{a5} = \frac{10(-1 + g)g^2}{g_{a4}};$$

$$g_{b3} = 9 + 2g(-24 + (-2 + g)g(-21 + 2g));$$

$$g_{b4} = (1 - g)g_{a4};$$

$$g_{b5} = \frac{2(9 - g(36 + g(-36 + 7g)))}{g_{a4}};$$

$$\text{FullSimplify}\left[\text{pblinear} - \left(\frac{g_{b3} - g g_c}{g_{b4}} + c g_{b5}\right)\right]$$

$$\text{FullSimplify}\left[\text{palinear} - \left(\frac{g_{a3} - 3 g_c}{g_{a4}} + c g_{a5}\right)\right]$$

0

0

(*Now we the analysis when B is instead not active*)

FullSimplify[1 - x1 /. {pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear}];

tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[% == 0, c]]

c1 = c /. tmp[[2, 1]]

$$\left\{\{c \rightarrow 1\}, \left\{c \rightarrow \frac{5}{3} + \frac{2}{3(-1 + g)}\right\}\right\}$$

$$\frac{5}{3} + \frac{2}{3(-1 + g)}$$

(*when c > c1 B is not active, but can it affect A obliging it to limit price?*)

uesc = u /. qb → 0

$$-\frac{1}{2}(1 - g)q_a^2 + q_a x$$

(* We first calculate the optimal monopoly price and check when this is admissible as an equilibrium when B is not active*)

```

qmonlinear = qa /. FullSimplify[Solve[D[uesc - pal qa, qa] == 0, qa]][[1, 1]]
Qmonlinear = FullSimplify[Integrate[qmonlinear, {x, pal, 1}]]
tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[D[Qmonlinear pal, pal] == 0, pal]]
pmonlinear = pal /. tmp[[1, 1]]

```

$$\frac{pal - x}{-1 + g}$$

$$-\frac{(-1 + pal)^2}{2(-1 + g)}$$


$$\left\{ \left\{ pal \rightarrow \frac{1}{3} \right\}, \left\{ pal \rightarrow 1 \right\} \right\}$$

$$\frac{1}{3}$$

(*now, it is clear that for any $c > 1/3$ if A sells as a monopolist, it does so as uncontested monopolist since B's lowest price= c is larger*)

(*also notice that indeed A makes a lower price than B*)


```
ContourPlot[palinear - pblinear, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0}]
```



(*and notice that A sells to some low types as monopolist with the palinear price*)

```
xlplot = xl /. {pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
```

```
ContourPlot[palinear - xlplot, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0}]
```





(*Some analysis of equilibrium prices*)

```
(*linear Price of A*)
pltcl = Plot[cl, {g, 0, 1/2}, PlotStyle -> {Thick}];

Limit[palinear, g -> 1/2]
Dpalinear = D[palinear, g];
Dpalinearplot = ContourPlot[Dpalinear, {g, 0, 1/2 - 0.000001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0}];
Show[Dpalinearplot, pltcl]

plotpalminusc = ContourPlot[palinear - c, {g, 0, 1/2 - 0.000001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0}];
Show[plotpalminusc, pltcl]
```

$$\frac{1}{8} (5c + 3\sqrt{c^2})$$



```
Solve[c == palinear /. g -> 0, c]
```

$$\left\{ \left\{ c \rightarrow \frac{1}{3} \right\} \right\}$$

```
cplot = 0.4;
```

```
palinearplot = palinear /. c -> cplot;
```


```
plotafirst = Plot[{cplot, palinearplot}, {g, 0, 1/2}, PlotRange -> {0, 0.5}];
```

```
cplot = 0.1;
```

```
palinearplot = palinear /. c -> cplot;
```

```
plotasecond = Plot[{cplot, palinearplot}, {g, 0, 1/2}, PlotRange -> {0, 0.5}];
```



```
Show[plotafirst, plotasecond]
```



```
(*linear Price of B*)
Limit[pblinear, g → 1 / 2]
Dpblinear = D[pblinear, g];
Dpblinearplot = ContourPlot[Dpblinear, {g, 0, 1 / 2 - 0.000001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0}];
Show[Dpblinearplot, pltcl ]

plotpbminusc = ContourPlot[pblinear - c, {g, 0, 1 / 2 - 0.000001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0}];
Show[plotpbminusc, pltcl ]
```

$$\frac{1}{8} \left(7c + \sqrt{c^2} \right)$$



(*NOW WE CAN DEFINE THE

PAYOFF: FIRST THE CASE IN WHICH B IS ACTIVE AND LINEAR PRICING*)

Qadl = FullSimplify[Integrate[qmonlinear, {x, pal, xl}] + Integrate[qal, {x, xl, 1}]];

Qbdl = FullSimplify[Integrate[qbl, {x, xl, 1}]];

Pradl = Simplify[Qadl pal]

Prbdl = Simplify[Qbdl (pbl - c)]

udl = FullSimplify[u - pal qa - pbl qb /. {qa -> qal, qb -> qbl}];

umondl = FullSimplify[uesc - pal qa /. {qa -> qmonlinear}];

Udl = FullSimplify[Integrate[umondl, {x, pal, xl}] + Integrate[udl, {x, xl, 1}]]

Wdl = FullSimplify[Pradl + Prbdl + Udl]

Carltondl = Max[Prbdl, Udl]

$$\frac{\text{pal} \left((-1 + \text{pal})^2 + g^2 (-2 + \text{pal} + \text{pbl})^2 - g (4 + 3 (-2 + \text{pal}) \text{pal} + (-2 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) \right)}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}$$

$$\frac{(-c + \text{pbl}) (1 - \text{pbl} + g (-2 + \text{pal} + \text{pbl}))^2}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}$$

$$- \frac{1}{6 (1 - 2g)^2} \left(\text{pal} (3 + (-3 + \text{pal}) \text{pal}) + g^2 (-2 + \text{pal} + \text{pbl})^3 + (-2 + \text{pbl}) (1 + (-1 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) + g (8 + 9 \text{pal}^2 - 3 \text{pal}^3 + \text{pbl} (-12 + (9 - 2 \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) - 3 \text{pal} (4 + (-2 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl})) \right)$$

$$\frac{1}{6 (1 - 2g)^2} \left(2 + \text{pal}^2 (-3 + 2 \text{pal}) + 2 g^2 (-2 + \text{pal} + \text{pbl})^2 (1 + \text{pal} + \text{pbl}) + \text{pbl}^2 (-3 + 2 \text{pbl}) + g (-8 + 9 \text{pal}^2 - 6 \text{pal}^3 - 6 \text{pal} (-1 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl} + (9 - 4 \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}^2) - 3 c (1 - \text{pbl} + g (-2 + \text{pal} + \text{pbl}))^2 \right)$$

$$\text{Max} \left[\frac{(-c + \text{pbl}) (1 - \text{pbl} + g (-2 + \text{pal} + \text{pbl}))^2}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}, \right.$$

$$\left. - \frac{1}{6 (1 - 2g)^2} \left(\text{pal} (3 + (-3 + \text{pal}) \text{pal}) + g^2 (-2 + \text{pal} + \text{pbl})^3 + (-2 + \text{pbl}) (1 + (-1 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) + g (8 + 9 \text{pal}^2 - 3 \text{pal}^3 + \text{pbl} (-12 + (9 - 2 \text{pbl}) \text{pbl}) - 3 \text{pal} (4 + (-2 + \text{pbl}) \text{pbl})) \right) \right]$$

(*WHEN INSTEAD B IS NOT ACTIVE*)

Qamonl = FullSimplify[Integrate[qmonlinear, {x, pal, 1}] /. pal → 1/3];

Pramonl = FullSimplify[Qamonlinear pal /. pal → 1/3]

umonl = uesc - pal qa /. qa → qmonlinear /. pal → 1/3;

Umonl = FullSimplify[Integrate[umonl, {x, 1/3, 1}]]

Wmonl = FullSimplify[Pramonl + Umonl]

Carltonmonl = Max[0, Umonl]

$$-\frac{2}{27(-1+g)}$$

$$-\frac{4}{81(-1+g)}$$

$$-\frac{10}{81(-1+g)}$$

$$\text{Max}\left[0, -\frac{4}{81(-1+g)}\right]$$

(*PART III EQUILIBRIUM WITH THE SELECTIVE

BAN: A CAN ONLY MAKE LINEAR PRICE WHILST B CAN USE LINEAR PRICES*)

(*we derive the b1 and b2 so that for a given pal they implement the quantity that B could implement using the optimal direct mechanism with the indirect utility*)

(*calculating the indirect utility for B*)

qatmp = qa /. Solve[D[u - pal qa, qa] == 0, qa][[1, 1]]

vb = FullSimplify[u - pal qa /. qa -> qatmp]

sb = vb - (1 - x) D[vb, x] - c qb (*this is the indirect virtual surplus for B*)

$$\frac{\text{pal} + g \text{qb} - x}{-1 + g}$$

$$\frac{(\text{pal} + \text{qb}) (\text{pal} + (-1 + 2g) \text{qb}) - 2 (\text{pal} + (-1 + 2g) \text{qb}) x + x^2}{2 - 2g}$$

$$-c \text{qb} - \frac{(1 - x) (-2 (\text{pal} + (-1 + 2g) \text{qb}) + 2x)}{2 - 2g} +$$

$$\frac{(\text{pal} + \text{qb}) (\text{pal} + (-1 + 2g) \text{qb}) - 2 (\text{pal} + (-1 + 2g) \text{qb}) x + x^2}{2 - 2g}$$

(*the the optimal quantity for B is...*)

FullSimplify[Solve[D[sb, qb] == 0, qb]]

$$\left\{ \left\{ \text{qb} \rightarrow \frac{1 + c - c g - g (2 + \text{pal})}{-1 + 2g} + 2x \right\} \right\}$$

Collect[FullSimplify[Solve[D[vb - pb, qb] == 0, qb]], x]

$$\left\{ \left\{ \text{qb} \rightarrow -\frac{b1(-1+g) + g \text{pal}}{-1 + 2b2(-1+g) + 2g} - \frac{(1-2g)x}{-1 + 2b2(-1+g) + 2g} \right\} \right\}$$

(*now we identify the parameters b1 and b2 so that the previous qb is equal to the optimal one obtained with the direct mechanism approach...*)

$$\text{tmp} = \text{FullSimplify}\left[\text{Solve}\left[\left\{2 = -\frac{(1-2g)}{-1+2b_2(-1+g)+2g}, \frac{1+c-cg-g(2+pal)}{-1+2g} = -\frac{b_1(-1+g)+gpal}{-1+2b_2(-1+g)+2g}\right\}, \{b_1, b_2\}\right]\right]$$

$$b1mixtmp = b1 /. \text{tmp}[[1, 1]]$$

$$b2mix = b2 /. \text{tmp}[[1, 2]]$$

$$\left\{\left\{b_1 \rightarrow \frac{1+c-cg+g(-2+pal)}{2-2g}, b_2 \rightarrow \frac{1-2g}{4(-1+g)}\right\}\right\}$$

$$\frac{1+c-cg+g(-2+pal)}{2-2g}$$

$$\frac{1-2g}{4(-1+g)}$$

(*now we find the best pal given these (optimal) b1 and b2 ...*)

$$\text{tmp} = \text{FullSimplify}\left[\text{Solve}\left[\{D[u-pal qa-pb, qb] = 0, D[u-pal qa-pb, qa] = 0\}, \{qa, qb\}\right]\right]$$

$$qamix = qa /. \text{tmp}[[1, 1]]$$

$$qbmix = qb /. \text{tmp}[[1, 2]]$$

$$\left\{\left\{qa \rightarrow \frac{-g(b_1+pal-2x)+(1+2b_2)(pal-x)}{-1+2b_2(-1+g)+2g}, qb \rightarrow -\frac{b_1(-1+g)+g(pal-2x)+x}{-1+2b_2(-1+g)+2g}\right\}\right\}$$

$$\frac{-g(b_1+pal-2x)+(1+2b_2)(pal-x)}{-1+2b_2(-1+g)+2g}$$

$$-\frac{b_1(-1+g)+g(pal-2x)+x}{-1+2b_2(-1+g)+2g}$$

$$xdmix = x /. \text{FullSimplify}\left[\text{Solve}\left[qbmix = 0, x\right]\right][[1, 1]]$$

$$\frac{b_1(-1+g)+gpal}{-1+2g}$$

$$Qamonmix = \text{FullSimplify}\left[\text{Integrate}\left[\frac{x-pal}{(1-g)}, \{x, pal, xdmix\}\right]\right]$$

$$Qadmix = \text{FullSimplify}\left[\text{Integrate}\left[qamix, \{x, xdmix, 1\}\right]\right]$$

$$-\frac{(-1+g)(b_1-pal)^2}{2(1-2g)^2}$$

$$\frac{((1+b_1(-1+g)+g(-2+pal))((1+2b_2)(-1+b_1(-1+g)+g(2-3pal)+2pal)+2g(1-pal+g(-2+b_1+pal))))}{(2(1-2g)^2(-1+2b_2(-1+g)+2g))}$$

(*then the optimal pal is...*)

palmixtmp = FullSimplify[Solve[D[(Qamonmix + Qadmix) pal, pal] 1 == 0, pal]]

$$\left\{ \left\{ \text{pal} \rightarrow \left(-2 - 4 b_2 + 6 g + 8 b_2 g - 4 g^2 + 2 b_1 g^2 + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(-12(1+b_2(2-4g) + (-3+g)g)(1+2b_2 - (4-2b_1+b_1^2+4b_2)g + (-2+b_1)^2g^2) + 16(-1+b_2(-2+4g) + g(3+(-2+b_1)g))^2)} \right) / (6b_2(-1+2g) - 3(1+(-3+g)g)) \right\}, \left\{ \text{pal} \rightarrow \left(-2 - 4 b_2 + 6 g + 8 b_2 g - 4 g^2 + 2 b_1 g^2 - \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(-12(1+b_2(2-4g) + (-3+g)g)(1+2b_2 - (4-2b_1+b_1^2+4b_2)g + (-2+b_1)^2g^2) + 16(-1+b_2(-2+4g) + g(3+(-2+b_1)g))^2)} \right) / (6b_2(-1+2g) - 3(1+(-3+g)g)) \right\} \right\}$$

(*the correct solution is the first one since it is the only one to give the right sign to second order condition*)

soca = FullSimplify[D[(Qamonmix + Qadmix) pal, pal, pal]];

FullSimplify[soca /. palmixtmp[[1, 1]] /. b2 -> b2mix]

FullSimplify[soca /. palmixtmp[[2, 1]] /. b2 -> b2mix]

paltmp = pal /. palmixtmp[[1, 1]]

$$\frac{\sqrt{\frac{1+2(-1+g)g(1+g(5-6g-4g^2+8g^3))-2b_1(-1+2g)(3+2g(-4+g(2+g)))+b_1^2(-1+g)(3+2g(-6+g(6+g)))}{(-1+g)^2}}}{(1-2g)^2}$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{\frac{1+2(-1+g)g(1+g(5-6g-4g^2+8g^3))-2b_1(-1+2g)(3+2g(-4+g(2+g)))+b_1^2(-1+g)(3+2g(-6+g(6+g)))}{(-1+g)^2}}}{(1-2g)^2}$$

$$\left(-2 - 4 b_2 + 6 g + 8 b_2 g - 4 g^2 + 2 b_1 g^2 + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(-12(1+b_2(2-4g) + (-3+g)g)(1+2b_2 - (4-2b_1+b_1^2+4b_2)g + (-2+b_1)^2g^2) + 16(-1+b_2(-2+4g) + g(3+(-2+b_1)g))^2)} \right) / (6b_2(-1+2g) - 3(1+(-3+g)g))$$

```

tmp = FullSimplify[Solve[pal == paltmp /. b1 -> blmixtmp /. b2 -> b2mix, pal]]
(*it can be shown that the admissible solution
is the second (the first it is sometime negative price)*)
palmix = pal /. tmp[[2, 1]]
blmix = FullSimplify[blmixtmp /. pal -> palmix]


{{pal ->
  (-4 + g (16 + g (-19 - 3 c (-1 + g) + 6 g)) - sqrt(2) sqrt((-1 + g) (-2 + g (-2 c (-1 + 2 g) (3 - 6 g + 2 g^3) + c^2
    (-1 + g) (3 + 2 g (-6 + g (6 + g))) + (-1 + g) (-11 + 2 g (7 + 2 g (-5 + 2 g)))))) /
  (-6 + g (24 + g (-24 + 5 g)))}, {pal -> (-4 + g (16 + g (-19 - 3 c (-1 + g) + 6 g)) +
  sqrt(2) sqrt((-1 + g) (-2 + g (-2 c (-1 + 2 g) (3 - 6 g + 2 g^3) + c^2 (-1 + g) (3 + 2 g (-6 + g (6 + g))) +
    (-1 + g) (-11 + 2 g (7 + 2 g (-5 + 2 g)))))) / (-6 + g (24 + g (-24 + 5 g)))}}

(-4 + g (16 + g (-19 - 3 c (-1 + g) + 6 g)) +
  sqrt(2) sqrt((-1 + g) (-2 + g (-2 c (-1 + 2 g) (3 - 6 g + 2 g^3) + c^2 (-1 + g) (3 + 2 g (-6 + g (6 + g))) +
    (-1 + g) (-11 + 2 g (7 + 2 g (-5 + 2 g)))))) / (-6 + g (24 + g (-24 + 5 g)))

1 / (2 - 2 g) (1 + c - c g + (g (8 + g (-32 + (29 - 3 c (-1 + g) - 4 g) g) +
  sqrt(2) sqrt((-1 + g) (-2 + g (-2 c (-1 + 2 g) (3 - 6 g + 2 g^3) + c^2 (-1 + g) (3 + 2 g (-6 + g (6 + g))) +
    (-1 + g) (-11 + 2 g (7 + 2 g (-5 + 2 g)))))) / (-6 + g (24 + g (-24 + 5 g))))

xcritbsol = xdmix /. {pal -> palmix, b1 -> blmix};
plotxcritb = ContourPlot[xcritbsol,
  {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {1}, DisplayFunction -> Identity];
plotclimit1 = Plot[c1, {g, 0, 1/2}, DisplayFunction -> Identity,
  PlotStyle -> {Thickness[0.008]}];
Show[plotxcritb, plotclimit1, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction]
(*this shows that the two boundaries with linear pricing and
with mix case are coincident, indeed the last marginal consumer
for B is the same in the two cases and then its best reponse*)

```



$Q_{amonmix} = \text{FullSimplify}[\text{Integrate}[(x - pal) / (1 - g), \{x, pal, xdmix\}]]$

$Q_{admix} = \text{FullSimplify}[\text{Integrate}[q_{amix}, \{x, xdmix, 1\}]]$

$$\frac{(-1 + g) (b1 - pal)^2}{2 (1 - 2g)^2}$$

$$\frac{((1 + b1 (-1 + g) + g (-2 + pal)) ((1 + 2b2) (-1 + b1 (-1 + g) + g (2 - 3pal) + 2pal) + 2g (1 - pal + g (-2 + b1 + pal))))}{(2 (1 - 2g)^2 (-1 + 2b2 (-1 + g) + 2g))}$$

q_{bmix}

$$\frac{b1 (-1 + g) + g (pal - 2x) + x}{-1 + 2b2 (-1 + g) + 2g}$$

(*DEFINING THE PAYOFFS WITH B ACTIVE IN THE MIX CASE (SELECTIVE BAN)*)

$Pr_{admix} = \text{Simplify}[(Q_{amonmix} + Q_{admix}) * pal];$

$Pr_{bdmix} = \text{Integrate}[(b1 - c) q_{bmix} + b2 q_{bmix}^2, \{x, xdmix, 1\}];$

$u_{dmix} = u - pal qa - b1 qb - b2 qb^2 /. \{qa \rightarrow q_{amix}, qb \rightarrow q_{bmix}\};$

$u_{monmix} = u_{esc} - pal qa /. \{qa \rightarrow (x - pal) / (1 - g)\};$

$U_{dmix} = \text{Integrate}[u_{monmix}, \{x, pal, xdmix\}] + \text{Integrate}[u_{dmix}, \{x, xdmix, 1\}];$

$W_{dmix} = Pr_{admix} + Pr_{bdmix} + U_{dmix};$

$Carlton_{dmix} = \text{Max}[Pr_{bdmix}, U_{dmix}];$

(*DEFINING THE PAYOFF IN THE MIX CASE WHEN B IS NOT ACTIVE*)

$$p_{monmix} = \frac{1}{3};$$

$$q_{monmix} = \frac{pal - x}{-1 + g};$$

$Q_{amonmix} = \text{FullSimplify}[\text{Integrate}[q_{monmix}, \{x, pal, 1\}] /. pal \rightarrow 1/3];$

$Pr_{amonmix} = \text{FullSimplify}[Q_{amonmix} pal /. pal \rightarrow 1/3]$

$u_{monmix} = u_{esc} - pal qa /. qa \rightarrow q_{monmix} /. pal \rightarrow 1/3;$

$U_{monmix} = \text{FullSimplify}[\text{Integrate}[u_{monmix}, \{x, 1/3, 1\}]]$

$W_{monmix} = \text{FullSimplify}[Pr_{amonmix} + U_{monmix}]$

$Carlton_{monmix} = \text{Max}[0, U_{monmix}]$

$$\frac{2}{27 - 27g}$$

$$-\frac{4}{81 (-1 + g)}$$

$$\frac{10}{81 - 81g}$$

$$\text{Max}\left[0, -\frac{4}{81 (-1 + g)}\right]$$

(*PART V DERIVING SOME EXPLICIT CASES*)

(*THE SYMMETRIC CASE WITH c=0*)

(*Simplifying the linear prices...*)

FullSimplify[{palignear, pblinear} /. c -> 0]

$$\left\{ \frac{2g(36 + g(-41 + 10g)) + 3 \left(-6 + \sqrt{(3 - 2g(5 + g(-5 + 2g)))^2} \right)}{(-3 + 4g)(9 + 4(-6 + g)g)}, \right. \\ \left. \frac{9 + g \left(-48 + 2(-2 + g)g(-21 + 2g) - \sqrt{(3 - 2g(5 + g(-5 + 2g)))^2} \right)}{(-1 + g)(-3 + 4g)(9 + 4(-6 + g)g)} \right\}$$

(*For some reasons Mathematica does not the simplification of the sqrt...*)

$$\text{FullSimplify} \left[\left\{ \frac{2g(36 + g(-41 + 10g)) + 3(-6 + (3 - 2g(5 + g(-5 + 2g))))}{(-3 + 4g)(9 + 4(-6 + g)g)}, \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. \frac{9 + g(-48 + 2(-2 + g)g(-21 + 2g) - (3 - 2g(5 + g(-5 + 2g))))}{(-1 + g)(-3 + 4g)(9 + 4(-6 + g)g)} \right\} \right]$$

$$\left\{ \frac{1 - 2g}{3 - 4g}, \frac{1 - 2g}{3 - 4g} \right\}$$

$$\text{plcnil} = \frac{1 - 2g}{3 - 4g};$$

Wsym = FullSimplify[WRLD /. a -> as /. c -> 0];


Wsyml = FullSimplify[Wdl /. {pal -> plcnil, pbl -> plcnil} /. c -> 0];

FullSimplify[Wsym - Wsyml]

Plot[Wsym - Wsyml, {g, 0, 1/2}]

NSolve[Wsym - Wsyml == 0, g]

$$\frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{4(-1 + g)^2(-5 + 8g)}{(-3 + 4g)^3} - \frac{1}{16} \left(-3 + 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right)^2 \right)$$



{{g -> -1.37571}, {g -> 1.16425}, {g -> 0.884602}, {g -> 0.5}, {g -> 0.5}, {g -> -0.0506961}}

(*firms are symmetric and we then consider only firm A here*)

Prasym = FullSimplify[PrarLD /. a -> as /. c -> 0]

Prasym1 = FullSimplify[Prad1 /. {pal -> plcn1, pbl -> plcn1} /. c -> 0]

FullSimplify[Prasym - Prasym1]


Plot[Prasym - Prasym1, {g, 0, 1/2}]

NSolve[Prasym - Prasym1 == 0, g]

$$-\frac{1}{48} \left(-3 + 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right) \left(1 + 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right)$$

$$\frac{2(-1 + g)^2(-1 + 2g)}{(-3 + 4g)^3}$$

$$-\frac{2(-1 + g)^2(-1 + 2g)}{(-3 + 4g)^3} - \frac{1}{48} \left(-3 + 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right) \left(1 + 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2 + 9g)} \right)$$



{g -> 0.856129 + 0.0836025 i}, {g -> 0.856129 - 0.0836025 i},
 {g -> 0.103491 + 0.657522 i}, {g -> 0.103491 - 0.657522 i}, {g -> 0.5}, {g -> 0.253523}

```


Usym = Simplify[URLD /. a -> as /. c -> 0]
Usym1 = Simplify[Udl /. {pal -> plcnil, pbl -> plcnil} /. c -> 0]
FullSimplify[Usym - Usym1]
Plot[Usym - Usym1, {g, 0, 1/2}]
NSolve[Usym - Usym1 == 0, g]
Plot[{Usym, Usym1}, {g, 0, 1/2}]

```


$$\frac{1}{48} \left(1 + 3g + \sqrt{1 - 2g + 9g^2} \right)^2$$

$$\frac{8(-1+g)^3}{3(-3+4g)^3}$$

$$-\frac{8(-1+g)^3}{3(-3+4g)^3} + \frac{1}{48} \left(1 + 3g + \sqrt{1 + g(-2+9g)} \right)^2$$



```
{g -> 0.807843 + 0.0530615 i}, {g -> 0.807843 - 0.0530615 i}, {g -> 0.5}, {g -> 0.140376}
```




(*PART IV PLOTTING THE FIGURES IN THE PAPER*)

(*COMPARISON NON-LINEAR VERSUS LINEAR*)

```

(*Plotting the six regions*)
cdplot = Plot[{cd}, {g, 0, 1/2}, AspectRatio → 1];
ctildeplot = Plot[{ctilde /. a → as}, {g, 0.001, 1/3}];
clplot = Plot[{cl}, {g, 0, 1/2}, PlotStyle → {Thick}];
clplotthick = Plot[{cl}, {g, 0, 1/2}, AspectRatio → 1,
  PlotRange → {0, 1}, PlotStyle → {Thickness[0.015], Black}];
constplot = Plot[{1/2}, {g, 1/3, 1/2}];
regionsplot = Show[cdplot, ctildeplot, clplot, constplot]
regionsplotfew = Show[cdplot, ctildeplot, constplot];
regionsplotveryfew = Show[cdplot, ctildeplot];
regionsplotNLP = Show[cdplot];
regionsplotforB = Show[constplot];

```



(*REGION 1*)

```

DPra1 = PraRMLD - Prad1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DPrb1 = PrbRMLD - Prbd1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DU1 = URMLD - Ud1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DW1 = WRMLD - Wd1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DCarlton1 = Max[DPrb1, DU1] /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};

```

```

DPraplot1 = ContourPlot[DPra1, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity,
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, cd > c > ctilde], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DPraplot1, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

```

```

DPrbplot1 = ContourPlot[DPrb1, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, cd > c > ctilde - 0.01], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DPrbplot1, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

```

```

DUplot1 = ContourPlot[DU1, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c > Min[ctilde, 1/2]], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DUplot1, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

```

```


DWplot1 = ContourPlot[DW1, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity,
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, cd > c > ctilde], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DWplot1, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]



```



```

DCarltonplot1 = ContourPlot[DCarlton1, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c > Min[ctilde, 1/2]], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DCarltonplot1, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

```







```
(*REGION 2*)
```

```
DPra2 = PraRLD - Prad1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DPrb2 = PrbRLD - Prbd1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DU2 = URLD - Ud1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DW2 = WRLD - Wd1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
```


```
DPraplot2 = ContourPlot[DPra2, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, Min[cd, ctilde] > c], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DPraplot2, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
```



```
DPrbplot2 = ContourPlot[DPrb2, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, Min[cd, ctilde] > c], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DPrbplot2, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
```



```
DUplot2 = ContourPlot[DU2, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity,
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, cd > c], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DUplot2, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
```

```
DWplot2 = ContourPlot[DW2, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, Min[cd, ctilde] > c], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DWplot2, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
```

```
DCarlton2 = Max[DPrb2, DU2] /. {a → as, pa → pal, pb → pbl};
DCarltonplot2 = ContourPlot[DCarlton2, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001},
  {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0}, ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &),
  DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, Min[cd, ctilde] > c],
  ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[DCarltonplot2, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
```







(*REGION 3*)

```

DPra3 = PraRLM - Prad1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DPrb3 = PrbRLM - Prbd1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DU3 = URLM - Ud1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DW3 = WRLM - Wd1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};

DPraplot3 = ContourPlot[DPra3, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, Min[1/2, c1] > c > cd], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01] }];
Show[DPraplot3, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]


DPrbplot3 = ContourPlot[DPrb3, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, Min[1/2, c1] + 0.01 > c > cd - 0.01], ContourStyle → {None} ];
Show[DPrbplot3, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]



DUplot3 = ContourPlot[DU3, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity,
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, Min[1/2, c1] + 0.0001 > c > cd - 0.01],
  ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01] }];
Show[DUplot3, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]



DWplot3 = ContourPlot[DW3, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, Min[1/2, c1] > c > cd], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01] }];
Show[DWplot3, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

DCarlton3 = Max[DPrb3, DU3] /. {a → as, pa → pal, pb → pbl};
DCarltonplot3 = ContourPlot[DCarlton3, {g, 0.00001, 1/2 - 0.00001}, {c, 0, 1},
  Contours → {0}, ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity,
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, Min[1/2, c1] + 0.001 > c > cd - 0.01],
  ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01] }];
Show[DCarltonplot3, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]


```







```
(*for some reason the numerical plot of DCarlton3 comes out with some issues,
however, inspection of DPrb3 and DU3 show that the Max of the
two should have the same shape of DU3 since DPrb3 is always negative,
hence we directly define the plot of Carlton figure in this case as that of DU3*)
DCarltonplot3 = DUplot3;
Show[DCarltonplot3, regionsplot, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction]
```



```
(*REGION 4*)
```



```
DPra4 = PraRLM - Pramnl /. {a -> as, pal -> palinear, pbl -> pblinear};
DPrb4 = PrbRLM - 0 /. {a -> as, pal -> palinear, pbl -> pblinear};
DU4 = URLM - Umonl /. {a -> as, pal -> palinear, pbl -> pblinear};
DW4 = WRLM - Wmonl /. {a -> as, pal -> palinear, pbl -> pblinear};
```



```
DPraplot4 = ContourPlot[DPra4, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0},
ColorFunction -> (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction -> Identity,
RegionFunction -> Function[{g, c, z}, 1/2 > c > c1], ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.01] }];
Show[DPraplot4, regionsplot, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction]
```

```
DPrbplot4 = ContourPlot[DPrb4, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, DisplayFunction -> Identity,
ColorFunction -> (If[#1 < 0, White, Gray] &), RegionFunction ->
Function[{g, c, z}, 1/2 > c > c1 - 0.01], ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.01] }];
Show[DPrbplot4, regionsplot, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction]
```


```
DUplot4 = ContourPlot[DU4, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0},
ColorFunction -> (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction -> Identity,
RegionFunction -> Function[{g, c, z}, 1/2 > c > c1], ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.01] }];
Show[DUplot4, regionsplot, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction]
```

```
DWplot4 = ContourPlot[DW4, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0},
ColorFunction -> (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction -> Identity,
RegionFunction -> Function[{g, c, z}, 1/2 > c > c1], ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.01] }];
Show[DWplot4, regionsplot, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction]
```





```
(*here since DPrb is always negative the Carlton test can be simply plotted with DU*)
DCarlton4 = DU4;
DCarltonplot4 = ContourPlot[DCarlton4, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0},
  ColorFunction -> (If[#1 > 0, White, White] &), DisplayFunction -> Identity,
  RegionFunction -> Function[{g, c, z}, 1/2 > c > c1], ContourStyle -> {None}];
Show[DCarltonplot4, regionsplot, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction]
```



```

(*REGION 5*)

DPra5 = PraRM - Pramon1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DPrb5 = PrbRM - 0 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DU5 = URM - Umon1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DW5 = WRM - Wmon1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};

DPraplot5 = ContourPlot[DPra5, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c > Max[1/2, c1]], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]}];
Show[DPraplot5, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

DPrbplot5 = ContourPlot[DPrb5, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, DisplayFunction → Identity,
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 < 0, White, Gray] &), RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c > Max[1/2, c1] - 0.05], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]}];
Show[DPrbplot5, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

DUplot5 = ContourPlot[DU5, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c > Max[1/2, c1]], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]}];
Show[DUplot5, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]



DWplot5 = ContourPlot[DW5, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c > Max[1/2, c1]], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]}];
Show[DWplot5, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]



DCarlton5 = Max[DPrb5, DU5] /. {a → as, pa → pal, pb → pbl};
DCarltonplot5 = ContourPlot[DCarlton5, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c > Max[1/2, c1]], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]}];


(*however, since in any case B is not active here we put an empty region *)
(* DCarltonplot5=DPrbplot5;
Show[DCarltonplot5, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
*)

DCarltonplot5 = DU5;
DCarltonplot5 = ContourPlot[DCarltonplot5, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, White] &), DisplayFunction → Identity,
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, 1/2 > c > c1], ContourStyle → {None}];
Show[DCarltonplot5, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

```







```

(*REGION 6*)

DPra6 = PraRM - Prad1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DPrb6 = PrbRM - Prbd1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DU6 = URM - Ud1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};
DW6 = WRM - Wd1 /. {a → as, pal → palinear, pbl → pblinear};

DPraplot6 = ContourPlot[DPra6, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c1 > c > Max[1/2, cd]], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]} ];
Show[DPraplot6, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

(*DPrbplot6=ContourPlot[DPrb6,{g,0,1/2},{c,0,1},Contours→{0},
  ColorFunction→(If[#1>0,White,Gray]&),DisplayFunction→Identity ,
  RegionFunction→Function[{g,c,z},cmaxlinear+0.01>c>Max[1/2,cd]-0.1],
  ContourStyle→{Thickness[0.01]} ];*)



DPrbplot6 = ContourPlot[DPrb6, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c1 - 0.01 > c > Max[1/2, cd] - 0.1], ContourStyle → {None} ];
Show[DPrbplot6, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]



DUplot6 = ContourPlot[DU6, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity,
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, c1 + 0.01 > c > Max[1/2, cd] - 0.01],
  ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]} ];
Show[DUplot6, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]


DWplot6 = ContourPlot[DW6, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c1 > c > Max[1/2, cd] - 0.01], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]} ];
Show[DWplot6, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

DCarlton6 = Max[DPrb6, DU6] /. {a → as, pa → pal, pb → pbl};
DCarltonplot6 = ContourPlot[DCarlton6, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity,
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, c1 - 0.01 > c > Max[1/2, cd] - 0.1],
  ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.0000000001]} ];
Show[DCarltonplot6, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]

```







(*Plotting all regions for comparison non-linear versus linear (Figure 2-7 in the paper)*)

```


RM = ContourPlot[1, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction →
  Function[{g, c, z}, c > Max[cd, 1/2]], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};

RLM = ContourPlot[1, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Lighter[Gray]] &), DisplayFunction → Identity,
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, 1/2 > c > cd], ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};

RLD = ContourPlot[1, {g, 0, 1/2 - 0.000001}, {c, 0, 1},
  Contours → {0}, ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Lighter[Lighter[Gray]]] &),
  DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, Min[cd, ctilde] > c],
  ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};

RMLD = ContourPlot[1, {g, 0, 1/2 - 0.000001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  ColorFunction → (If[#1 > 0, White, Lighter[Lighter[Lighter[Gray]]] &),
  DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, cd > c > ctilde],
  ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.01]};
Show[RM, RLM, RLD, RMLD, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]



```



```

(*Plotting the four regions with non linear pricing*)
cdplot = Plot[{cd}, {g, 0, 1/2}, AspectRatio → 1];
ctildeplot = Plot[{ctilde /. a → as}, {g, 0.001, 1/3}];
clplot = Plot[{cl}, {g, 0, 1/2}, PlotStyle → {Thick}];
clplotthick = Plot[{cl}, {g, 0, 1/2}, AspectRatio → 1,
  PlotRange → {0, 1}, PlotStyle → {Thickness[0.015], Black}];
constplot = Plot[{1/2}, {g, 1/3, 1/2}];

```



(*Figure 2 in the paper*)

```

RM = ContourPlot[1, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0},
  ColorFunction -> (If[#1 > 0, White, Gray] &), DisplayFunction -> Identity, RegionFunction ->
  Function[{g, c, z}, c > Max[cd, 1/2]], ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.01]};


RLM = ContourPlot[1, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0},
  ColorFunction -> (If[#1 > 0, White, Lighter[Gray]] &), DisplayFunction -> Identity,
  RegionFunction -> Function[{g, c, z}, 1/2 > c > cd], ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.01]};


RLD = ContourPlot[1, {g, 0, 1/2 - 0.000001}, {c, 0, 1},
  Contours -> {0}, ColorFunction -> (If[#1 > 0, White, Lighter[Lighter[Gray]]] &),
  DisplayFunction -> Identity, RegionFunction -> Function[{g, c, z}, Min[cd, ctilde] > c],
  ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.01]};

RMLD = ContourPlot[1, {g, 0, 1/2 - 0.000001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0},
  ColorFunction -> (If[#1 > 0, White, Lighter[Lighter[Lighter[Gray]]]] &),
  DisplayFunction -> Identity, RegionFunction -> Function[{g, c, z}, cd > c > ctilde],
  ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.01]};


Show[RM, RLM, RLD, RMLD, regionsplot, PlotRange -> {0, 1},
  TextStyle -> {FontSlant -> "Italic", FontSize -> 12}, AxesLabel -> {"γ", "c"},
  Frame -> True, FrameLabel -> {"Prod. differentiation γ", "Cost asymmetry c"}]

```







Show[DPraplot1, DPraplot2, DPraplot3, DPraplot4, DPraplot5, DPraplot6, regionsplot, FrameLabel -> {"Prod. differentiation γ ", "Cost asymmetry c "}, FormatType -> StandardForm] (*figure 3 in the paper*)




```
Show[DPrbplot6, DPrbplot5, DPrbplot1, DPrbplot2, DPrbplot3, DPrbplot4, regionsplot,
FrameLabel -> {"Prod. differentiation  $\gamma$ ", "Cost asymmetry c"}, FormatType -> StandardForm]
(*figure 4 in the paper*)
```




```
Show[DUplot1, DUplot3, DUplot4, DUplot5, DUplot2, DUplot6, regionsplot,
FrameLabel -> {"Prod. differentiation  $\gamma$ ", "Cost asymmetry c"}, FormatType -> StandardForm]
(*figure 5 in the paper*)
```



```
Show[DCarltonplot6, DCarltonplot1, DCarltonplot5,
      DCarltonplot3, DCarltonplot2, DCarltonplot4, regionsplot,
      FrameLabel -> {"Prod. differentiation  $\gamma$ ", "Cost asymmetry c"}, FormatType -> StandardForm]
(*figure 6 in the paper*)
```



```
Show[DWplot1, DWplot2, DWplot3, DWplot4, DWplot5, DWplot6, regionsplot,
      FrameLabel -> {"Prod. differentiation \gamma", "Cost asymmetry c"}, FormatType -> StandardForm]
(*figure 7 in the paper*)
```




(* COMPARISONS: MIX-SELECTIVE BAN VERSUS NON-LINEAR *)

(*REGION 1*)

```
DWlmix = WRMLD - Wdmix /. {a → as, pal → palmix, b1 → b1mix, b2 → b2mix};
```

```
DWplotlmix = ContourPlot[DWlmix == 0, {g, 0.0001, 1/2 - 0.0001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},  
  DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, cd > c > ctilde],  
  ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.007], Dashed}];
```

```
Show[DWplotlmix, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
```




(*REGION 2*)

```
DW2mix = WRLD - Wdmix /. {a → as, pal → palmix, b1 → b1mix, b2 → b2mix};
```

```
DWplot2mix = ContourPlot[DW2mix == 0, {g, 0.001, 1/2 - 0.001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  DisplayFunction → Identity, RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, Min[cd, ctilde] > c],
  ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.007], Dashed}];
```

```
Show[DWplot2mix, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
```




(*REGION 3*)

```
DW3mix = WRLM - Wdmix /. {a -> as, pal -> palmix, b1 -> blmix, b2 -> b2mix};
```

```
DWplot3mix = ContourPlot[DW3mix == 0, {g, 0, 1/2 - 0.001}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0},
  DisplayFunction -> Identity, RegionFunction -> Function[{g, c, z}, Min[1/2, c1] > c > cd],
  ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.007], Dashed}];
```


```
Show[DWplot3mix, regionsplot, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction]
```



(*REGION 4*)

```
DW4mix = WRLM - Wmonmix /. {a → as, pal → palmix, b1 → b1mix, b2 → b2mix};
```

```
DWplot4mix = ContourPlot[DW4mix == 0, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},
  DisplayFunction → Identity, ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.007], Dashed},
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, 1/2 > c > c1]];
Show[DWplot4mix, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
```




(*REGION 5*)

```
DW5mix = WRM - Wmonmix /. {a → as, pal → palmix, b1 → b1mix, b2 → b2mix};
```

```
DWplot5mix = ContourPlot[DW5mix == 0, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours → {0},  
  DisplayFunction → Identity, ContourStyle → {Thickness[0.007], Dashed},  
  RegionFunction → Function[{g, c, z}, c > Max[1/2, c1]]];
```


```
Show[DWplot5mix, regionsplot, DisplayFunction → $DisplayFunction]
```



(*REGION 6*)

```
DW6mix = WRM - Wdmix /. {a -> as, pa1 -> palmix, b1 -> blmix, b2 -> b2mix};
```

```
DWplot6mix = ContourPlot[DW6mix == 0, {g, 0, 1/2}, {c, 0, 1}, Contours -> {0},
  DisplayFunction -> Identity, ContourStyle -> {Thickness[0.007], Dashed},
  RegionFunction -> Function[{g, c, z}, c1 > c > Max[1/2, cd]]];
Show[DWplot6mix, regionsplot, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction]
```



(*Plotting all regions for comparison non-linear versus mix (only welfare), figure 8 in the paper*)

```
Show[DWplot1, DWplot2, DWplot3, DWplot4, DWplot5, DWplot6, DWplot1mix,
  DWplot2mix, DWplot3mix, DWplot4mix, DWplot5mix, DWplot6mix, regionsplot,
  FrameLabel -> {"Prod. differentiation gamma", "Cost asymmetry c"}, FormatType -> StandardForm]
(*figure 8 in the paper*)
```

