Microeconomics 3

NEW!!! The new date for the February exam is Friday 10, at 2 p.m.

Results of the written exam (21/12/2011) are available here.

Fall term (from November 10 to December 15)
Lectures of “Micro 3” take place in piazza Scaravilli 2, on Thursday and on Friday from 9 to 12.
Click here to see where lectures take place.

Lecturer
Francesca Barigozzi
E-mail: francesca.barigozzi@unibo.it
Office hours, third floor (p.zza Scaravilli 1):
See here: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/barigozzi/corsi/corsi.htm
Note: office hours are for the purpose of addressing questions relating to the course. I will not deal with those over e-mail

Teaching assistant
Matteo Maria Cati
E-mail: matteomaria.cati@unibo.it
Office hours: see here http://www.moodle.unibo.it/course/category.php?id=171

Contents and purpose of the course
The purpose of this course is to introduce students to an analytical and in-depth study of market failures and to treat some of the main topics in the field of information economics. After a brief introduction to the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics and their implications, a formal analysis of main market failures is provided: externalities, public goods, and information asymmetries will be analyzed. Particular attention will be devoted to topics related to information economics: principal-agent models, moral hazard, adverse selection (signaling and screening).

Topics
1. Introduction: the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics and their implications.
2. Public goods.
3. Externalities.
4. Introduction to the economics of information.
5.
Markets under adverse selection (the market for lemons). Signaling, and screening.
5. The theory of optimal risk-sharing. The principal-agent problem. Contracts under moral hazard.
6. Contracts under adverse selection.
7. Applications: market failures in health insurance, credence goods.

Main readings
Suggested readings for this course are:
- Externalities and public goods: Varian, H., Microeconomic Analysis, III ed., Norton, 1992, chaps 23 and 24.
- The market for lemons, signaling and screening: A.Mas-Colell, M.Whinston and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995, chap 13.
- Optimal risk-sharing and moral hazard: Milgrom-Roberts, Economics Organization and Management, McGraw Hill, 1992, chaps.5 and 7.
- The Revelation Principle: Laffont, J.J. and D. Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press, 2001, chap 2.
- Adverse selection and moral-hazard in contracts theory: Bolton P. and M. Dewatripont, Contract Theory, The MIT Press, 2005, chaps 2 (sections 2.1 and 2.3.3) and 4 (sections 4.1 and 4.2).
- Games with incomplete information: Gibbons R., A primer in Game Theory, Prentice Hall, 1992, chaps 3 and 4.

Additional readings (downloadable from the table below)

  1. Andreoni J. (1988), Why free ride?, Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291-304.
  2. Andreoni J. and L. Vesterlund (2001), Which is the fair sex?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 293-312.
  3. Dulleck U., R. Kerschbamer (2006), On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists - The Economics of Credence Goods, Journal of Economic Literature 44, 5-42.
  4. Fehr E. and S. Gächter, (2000), Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, The American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.
  5. Holt C.A. and S.K. Laury, (1997), Classroom Games: Voluntary Provision of a Public Good, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4), 209-215.
  6. Rees R., and A. Wambach, (2008), The Microeconomics of Insurance, Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, Vol.4, Nos.1-2, 1-163.
  7. M. Rothschild; J. Stiglitz, (1976), Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 629-649.
  8. Stiglitz, J.E. (2000), The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, pp. 1441-1478.
  9. Market failures in the health insurance market. Slides
    Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
    Rees and Wambach (2008)

    To learn more: Obama health insurance reform by Paolo Nicola Barbieri A brief summary

Exam rules

To see how the assignment can be: click here (assignment 1 a.y. 2010/11) and also here (assignment 2 a.y. 2010/11).

Course plan

Lecture
Topic
Lecture 1
Thursday, November 10
9 a.m. - 12 a.m.
room 32
Introduction to the couse. Slides
A class experiment based on Holt and Laury (1997)
Introduction to Public Goods
Lecture 2
Friday, November 11
9 a.m. - 12 a.m.
room 12

Public goods. Slides
Results of our class experiment on Public Goods Slides

Lecture 3
Thursday, November 17
FIRST OUR IN THE LAB
9 a.m. - 12 a.m
DSE seminar room

Fehr and Gachter (2000) Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) Andreoni (1988)
Externalities Slides

Lecture 4
Friday, November 18
9 a.m. - 12 a.m
room
12

Externalities
Results of our class experiment on externalities Slides
Results 1, Results 2
Introduction to asymmetric information. Slides
Stiglitz (2000)

Lecture 5
Thursday, November 24
FIRST OUR IN THE LAB
9 a.m. - 12 a.m
room 11

Markets with adverse selection. Slides

Lecture 6
Friday, November 25
9 a.m. - 12 a.m
room 12

Results of our class experiment on adv.selection Slides
Results
Static games with incomplete information
Slides

Lecture 7
Thursday, December 1
9 a.m. - 12 a.m
room 32

Signaling Slides
Dynamic games with incomplete information
Slides
(no refinements)

Lecture 8
Friday, December 2
9 a.m. - 12 a.m
room12

Screening Slides
Optimal risk-sharing. Slides

Lecture 9
Friday, December 9
9 a.m. - 12 a.m
room 12

Introduction to contract theory. Slides
Moral-hazard Slides

Lecture 10
Thursday, December 15
9 a.m. - 12 a.m
room 32

Adverse selection Slides